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THE CASE OF THE PRISONERS AND THE
ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
WILLIAM MICHAEL TREANORt
INTRODUCTION

For over one hundred years, scholars have closely studied the
handful of cases in which state courts, in the years before the
Federal Constitutional Convention, confronted the question
whether they had the power to declare laws invalid. 1 Interest in
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This Article is part of what will be a larger study of revolutionary-era judicial
review cases. That study will use these cases to examine competing conceptions of
constitutional interpretation and of judicial review prior to ratification of the Federal
Constitution. It will also explore the extent to which judicial review was accepted
(and opposed) in different states and the factors that contributed to these divergent
responses.
1
In I 953, Professor William Crosskey described nine revolutionary-era cases as
comprising the "traditional list" of potential precedents for judicial review. 2
WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 944 (I 953). As Professor Suzanna Sherry has observed, "[Crosskey's]
list of cases has not been improved upon." Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwrillen
Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. II27, II35 n.36 (I987).
Most of these nine cases do not appear in reporters, and in one instance it
appears that a rumored decision did not in fact exist. Because of different interpretations of the evidence, scholars have claimed that as many as six of them are cases in
which a court asserted the power to invalidate a statute, see CHARLES G. HAINES, THE
AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 88-I2I (2d ed. I959), and, at the other
extreme, that none of these cases is a precedent for judicial review, see I LOUIS B.
BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY SI-72, 53I-63 (1932). The following is, in
chronological order, the "traditional list," including the reporter in which the case
appears or, if it does not appear in a reporter, the published source or sources
containing the fullest account of the case: Josiah Philips's Case (Va. I778), described
(491)
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these early cases began in the late nineteenth century as one aspect
of the larger debate about the legitimacy of judicial review, a debate
triggered by the increasing frequency with which the Supreme Court
and state courts were invalidating economic and social legislation.
The lawyers, political scientists, and historians who initially
unearthed the case law from the 1770s and 1780s used the product
of their research to argue either that judicial review was sufficiently
established at the time of the Federal Constitutional Convention so
as to be part of the original understanding, even though the
Constitution makes no mention of judicial review or, alternatively,
that Marbury v. Madison 2 was an act of judicial usurpation. 3 In this
century, scholars have continued to study these cases as part of that
debate. 1 More recently, the cases have been at the core of the

in 2 CROSSKEY, supra, at 944-48;] ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA bk.
I, pt. 1, app. at 293 (1803): Holmes v. Walton (N J. 1780), described in Austin Scott,
Holmes v. Walton: The New jersey Precedent, 4 AM. IIIST. REV. 456 (1899); Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782) (this case was contemporaneously known as
the Case of the Prisoners and is the subject of this Article); Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y.
City Mayor's Ct. 1784), Teprinted in ] JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., THE LAW PRACTICE OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 393-419 (1964); HENRY B.
DAWSON, THE CASE OF ELIZABETH RUTGERS VERSUS JOSHUA WADDINGTON (1866)
(providing a compilation of relevant materials); Symsbury Case, 1 Kirby 444 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1785 ); Trevett v. Weeden (R.I. 1786), described in JAMES M. VARNUM, THE
CASE, TREVETT V. WEEDEN: ON INFORMATION AND COMPL\INT, FOR REFUSING PAPER
BILLS IN PAYMENT FOR BUTCHER'S MEAT, !N MARKET, AT PAR WITH SPECIE (1787);
"Ten-Pound Act" Cases (N.II. 1786), described in 2 CROSSKEY, supra, at 968-71; Bayard
v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 48 (1787). The ninth potential judicial review case, a
Massachusetts case referred to in a letter from J.B. Cutting to Thomas Jefferson,
appears to have never occurred; Cutting apparently misread a newspaper article
describing one of theN ew I Iampshi1·e "Ten-Pound Act" cases. See 2 CROSS KEY, supra,
at 961-62; A.C. Goodell, An Early Constitutional Case in Massachusetts, 7 HARV. L. REV.
415 (1894).
2
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3
See ROBERT L. CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 48-55,
166-75 ( 1989) (discussing late-19th-century examination ofrevolutional·y-erajudicial
review cases and debate about judicial review). Among the most important books and
articles from this period are the following: BRINTON COXE, AN ESSAY ON JUDICIAL
POWER AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION 216-71 (1893); ] JAMES B. THAYER,
CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55-80 (1895); Charles B. Elliot, The Legislatures and
the Courts: The Power to Declare Statutes Unconstitutional, 5 POL. SCI. Q. 224, 233-39
( I890); Goodell, supra note I; William M. Meigs, The Relation of the judicimy to the
Constitution, 19 AM. L. REV. 175 (I885); Scott, supra note I; James B. Thayer, The
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. I29,
I3I-40 (1893); William P. Trent, The Case of josiah Philips, I AM. HIST. REV. 444
(1896).
4
For examples of 20th-century studies of ,-evolutionary-era cases, see RAOUL
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controversy over whether the original understanding permits the use
of extraconstitutional sources, such as natural law, in judicial
review. 5
Given that judicial review in the revolutionary era is one of the
most closely scrutinized subjects in legal history, it has long
appeared that any significant primary sources from these cases had
been analyzed. Indeed, it has been over forty years since a new
source has been brought to bear on the study of revolutionary-era
judicial review. 6 Remarkably, however, there are two sets of

BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 36-46 (1969); 1 BOUDIN, supra note 1, at
51-72, 531-63; CLINTON, supra note 3, at 48-55; 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 1, at 938-75;
1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 125-42 (1971); HAINES, supra note 1, at
88-121; LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 89-99
( 1988); SYLVIA SNOWJSS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 13-53
(1990); SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW 110-17
(1 990); CHARLES WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT
43-48 (1 925); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 17761787, at 453-63 (1 969); L.B. Boudin, Government by judiciary, 26 POL. SCI. Q. 238, 21147 (1911); EdwardS. Corwin, The Establishment of judicial Review, 9 MICH. L. REV.
102, 110-20 (1910); Report of the Committee upon the Duty of Courts to Refuse to t.xecute
Statutes in Contravention of the Fundamental Law, 38 N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N PROC. 230,28087 (1915); Jesse Turner, A Phantom Precedent, 48 AM. L. REV. 321, 321-41 (1911);
Jesse Turner, Four Fugitive Cases from the Realm of American Constitutional Law, 49 AM.
L. REV. 818, 818-51 (1915); Charles Warren, Earliest Cases of judicial Review of State
Legislation by Federal Courts, 32 YALE LJ. 15, 15-28 (1922).
5
See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment,
61 U. CJN. L. REV. 49, 63-73 (1992); Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natural Law in
Early American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate judicial Enforcement of
"Unwritten" Individual Rights?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 421,448-57 (1991); Robert E. Riggs,
Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941, 977-80; Sherry, supra note 1,
at 1134-46.
6
The last time a new primary source was first analyzed was 1952, when David
Mays discussed Edmund Pendleton's notes in the Case of the Prisoners in the context
of his account of the case in his biography of Pendleton. See 2 D.-WID J. MAYS,
EDMUND PENDLETON, 1721-1803: A BIOGRAPHY 187-202 (1952). Mays subsequently
published Pendleton's notes. See Edmund Pendleton, Pendleton's Account of "The Case
of the Prisoners," in 2 THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON, 1734-1803,
at 416-27 (David J. Mays ed., 1967). Cross key made use of Pendleton's notes in their
unpublished form. See 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 1, at 958-60. They have been ignored,
however, in a number of the most important recent accounts of revolutionary-era
judicial review cases, all of which have placed exclusive reliance on Call's account. SPe
CLINTON, supra note 3, at 49; SNOWJSS, supra note 4, at 17-24, 33; WOOD, supm note
4, at 454-55; Sherry, supra note 1, at 1143-45. None of these accounts mentions the
published notes. Sherry, in a footnote, states that Cross key called into question Call's
report, but she adds that Mays, in his biography, had used Pendleton's notes "to
support Call's reporting." ld. at 1143-44 n.90. In fact, as indicated in the next
section of this chapter, see infra part I, Call's and Pendleton's accounts differ
dramatically, and, where they conflict, Mays invariably followed Pendleton.
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unpublished attorneys' notes that have been preserved in library
collections of personal papers that have never been analyzed by
scholars of judicial review: the notes of Edmund Randolph and of
St. George Tucker in Virginia's 1782 Case of the Prisoners (which
reporter Daniel Call entitled Commonwealth v. Caton 7 when he
published a report of the case in 1827). 8 These notes are significant in part because their authors were to become major legal
figures and their early thinking on judicial review is therefore of
value to constitutional historians. As a member of the Federal
Constitutional Convention, Randolph proposed the Virginia Plan,
the principal source for the Federal Constitution, and he subsequently was the first United States Attorney General and, later,
Thomas Jefferson's successor as Secretary of State. 9 Although now
largely forgotten, Tucker was a member of the Virginia Court of
Appeals, a federal judge, 10 and, in the words of Dean Paul Carring-

7

8 Va. ( 4 Call) 5 (1782).
See Edmund Randolph, Rough Draft of Argument in Respondent v. Lamb (the
Case of the Prisoners) (original in 91 James Madison Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) (copy on file with author); St. George Tucker,
Notes of Oral Argument in the Case of the Prisoners (original in Papers of St. George
Tucker, Manuscripts Department, Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and
Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia) (copy on file with author).
It should be noted that, in addition to being overlooked by scholars of judicial
review, these two sets of notes have been essentially overlooked by other scholars and
neither lawyer's arguments for judicial review nor discussions of constitutional
construction have been discussed in print. Randolph's notes were sent to Madison
as an attachment to his letter to Madison of March 7, 1783. The notes were filed in
Madison's Papers at the Library of Congress separately from the cover letter, which
may explain why the notes have not been focused on earlier. The cover letter, unlike
Randolph's notes, has been published. See Letter from Edmund Randolph to James
Madison (Mar. 7, 1783), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 318, 318-19 (William T.
Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1969) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS]. The
accompanying editorial footnote has several sentences summarizing Randolph's
conception of the Virginia Constitution as fundamental law, but says nothing about
Randolph's position on judicial review or on how to construe a constitution. See
William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal, Notes to Letter from Edmund
Randolph, in 6 MADISON PAPERS, supra, at 321 n.8. Prior to this Article, this brief
note appears to be the only published discussion of any part of the contents of
Randolph's notes.
Apparently, the only prior discussion of the argument in Tucker's notes is found
in Charles Cullen's biography of Tucker. Cullen simply observed that Tucker "made
a strong argument for ... judicial review" in the Case of the Prisoners, without stating
what that argument was. CHARLES T. CULLEN, ST. GEORGE TUCKER AND LAW IN
VIRGINIA, 1772-1804, at 36 (1987).
9
See JOHN J. REARDON, EDMUND RANDOLPH: A BiOGRAPHY 98-99, 189-91 (1974).
10
See CULLEN, supra note 8, at 189.
8

1994)

THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

495

ton, "arguably the most important American legal scholar of the
first half of the nineteenth century." 11
Far more significant, however, is the fact that Randolph's and
Tucker's notes are perhaps the best evidence that we have about
how people at the time of the Constitution's drafting thought a
court should construe a constitution, a subject of critical concern to
originalists today. These notes are apparently the only surviving
sources from the revolutionary era in which attorneys in a case in
which a statute's validity was challenged discussed how to interpret
constitutional provisions. Similarly, other than in the Case of the
Prisoners, none of the judicial opinions of which we have a record
confronts the issue of constitutional construction. The absence of
consideration of this issue is not surprising because these cases
primarily involved challenges to statutes based on violations of
unwritten fundamental law, such as the traditional right to a jury,
rather than on violations of written constitutions. 12 Furthermore,
as Professor Charles Lofgren has observed, "[t]he members of the
Philadelphia Convention were silent about how they expected the
Constitution to be interpreted. " 13 Adding to the value of Randolph's and Tucker's analyses is the fact that they both argued out
of personal conviction, rather than to advance the interests of a
client. Tucker, appearing before the court as an amicus, was
arguing for himself.
More surprisingly, Randolph, although
contending as state attorney general that the challenged statute
should be upheld, informed the court that he was duty bound to

11
Paul D. Carrington, The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education, 3I WM.
& MARY L. REV. 527, 540 (1990).
12
See Sherry, supra note I, at II35-46 (discussing cases). The one case other than
the Case of the Prisoners to turn clearly on a written constitution was Bayard v.
Singleton, I N.C. (Mart.) 48 (1787), but the treatment of the conflict between statute
and constitution was conclusory. The statute at issue barred property owners from
bringing suit to recover land confiscated by the state. North Carolina's constitution
guaranteed the right to a trial by jury. See N.C. CONST. of I776, art. XIV, reprinted
in 5 FRANCIS N. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES
NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2788 (1909).
Without analysis, the court asserted that the challenged statute and state constitution
were in conflict because "by the constitution every citizen had undoubtedly a right to
a decision of his property by a trial by jury." Bayard, I N.C. (Mart.) at 49.
13
Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 77, 79 (1988); see also H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 904 (I985) ("[T]he Philadelphia framers did not discuss in any detail how they intended their end product to be
interpreted .... ").
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disclose his personal belief that a statute could be declared
unconstitutional. In short, neither set of notes reflects partisan
bias.
For originalists, then, these notes are a uniquely valuable guide
to background understandings of how the Constitution was to be
interpreted.
What makes them of dramatic significance for
originalists is that, as this Article will show, the notes reflect views
of constitutional interpretation that are at odds with leading
modern scholarship on the original understanding of the Framers
on matters such as the significance of original intent, the judicial
obligation to follow constitutional text strictly, and the extent to
which courts should defer to legislatures. Thus, this new evidence
is not only the best evidence we have about constitutional construction at the time of the framing, but it directly challenges received
notions about the original understanding of that subject. Given the
importance of originalism to modern constitutional jurisprudence,
this challenge has important current ramifications in terms of how
the Constitution should be understood.
Apart from the specific value of these notes, the Case of the
Prisoners-in which three condemned men claimed that Virginia's
Treason Statute violated the state constitution-merits careful study
because it was in all likelihood the earliest case in which an
American court, after independence, faced the issue of whether it
could declare a statute unconstitutional, and because the case
provided the occasion on which an astonishing number of important
figures were forced to confront that issue for the first time. Two of
the judges, George Wythe and John Blair, joined Randolph as
representatives of Virginia at the Federal Constitutional Convention.
John Francis Mercer, one of the lawyers who, like Tucker, argued as
an amicus in the case, attended the Convention as a delegate from
Maryland. James Madison was also intimately familiar with the case.
He corresponded with both Chancellor Edmund Pendleton, the
presiding judge, and Randolph about the case and acquired
Pendleton's notes of his opinion. After repeated requests from
Madison, Randolph sent him a part of the rough draft of his
argument. 14 To the extent, then, that the early cases deserve
examination in order to determine what arguments concerning

14 For the list of participants in the Constitutional Convention, see 3 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 587-90 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937).
For discussion of the participants in the Case of the Prisoners, see infra part I. On the
Case of the Prisoners as the first judicial review case, see infra note 212.
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judicial review the Framers were exposed to and what their
reactions to those arguments were, the Case of the Prisoners is worthy
of close focus; it is probable that no other case was so well-known
to such a large group of Framers. To the extent that the early cases
merit study in order to understand Marbury, the Case of the Prisoners
is particularly worthy of attention: apparently present among the
crowd that gathered in the courtroom to hear the decision was John
Marshall, then a young Virginia lawyer. 15
Part I of this Article draws on Randolph's and Tucker's notes as
well as other primary sources, such as letters, government records,
and Pendleton's notes, to provide a detailed account of the Case of
the Prisoners. These records indicate that two of the eight judges on
the court of appeals took the position that the court had the power
to declare statutes unconstitutional-one of the judges being
Marshall's former law professor, George Wythe-and these may have
been the first American judges to take this position. Only one
judge held that the court did not have this power, and the others
did not reach the issue.
Part II discusses the relevance of the case to a number of critical
originalist legal debates. Perhaps most significant is the case's
bearing on the question whether the founding generation believed
original intent relevant to constitutional interpretation. In the
leading article on the topic, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, H. Jefferson Powell argued that the original understanding
was that the Framers' subjective intent was irrelevant. 16 Understandably (given that he did not have access to Randolph's and
Tucker's notes, the only surviving revolutionary-era legal documents
that seriously examined the issue), Powell based his view of the
background understanding animating the Framers on inferences
from schools of interpretation that he believed available to the
Framers, and he did not probe revolutionary-era case law. Tucker
and Randolph, however, both appealed to original intent, and
Tucker, more to the point, specifically invoked the subjective intent
of the state constitution's framers. The case thus suggests that the
Framers of the Federal Constitution had available to them a view of
interpretation under which their subjective intent was directly
relevant to constitutional construction.

15
See Charles F. Hobson et al., Introduction to 5 THE PAPERS OF jOHN MARSHALL
at xxiii,lvii-lviii {Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1974) [hereinafter MARSHALL PAPERS].
16
Powell, supra note 13.

498

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 143:491

More broadly, where Powell argues that the only hermeneutic
traditions available to the Framers were completely or predominantly focused on text, the Case of the Prisoners suggests that many of the
founding generation were "anti-literalists" 17 who believed constitutions should be interpreted in light of their spirit, even when the
spirit was at odds with the text. Indeed, appeals to the spirit of the
Virginia Constitution are central to the arguments advanced in the
case and indicate that extraconstitutional sources (including, but not
limited to, evidence of original intent) were considered relevant to
constitutional interpretation.
At the same time, the Case of the Prisoners challenges the
conclusion reached by scholars who argue that early theories of
judicial review embodied a constrained conception of the judicial
role. While Randolph's argument reflects a limited notion of
judicial review, Tucker's argument rests on an expansive view of
judicial review. His argument, in conjunction with subsequent
Virginia case law, demonstrates the presence of an aggressive
conception of judicial review in the early republic. This Article thus
suggests that an activist approach to judicial review can claim
originalist support.
Professor Suzanna Sherry has previously
provided originalist support for judicial activism, but her claim in
this regard is that revolutionary-era judges applied natural law. 18
In contrast, this Article delineates an expansive conception of the
judicial role based on construction of a written constitution in
accordance with its spirit. It therefore significantly contributes to
the debate about the founding generation's understanding of the
scope of judicial review by offering evidence of judicial activism
grounded, not in natural law, but in a broad reading of a constitution. From the perspective of originalism, this claim is of signal
importance since activist modern constitutional jurisprudence
involves expansive readings of constitutional text, not applications
of natural law. 19

17
The term is Professor Morton Horwitz's. See Morton]. Horwitz, The Constitution
of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 49
( 1993); see also William M. Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the
Revival of"Unconstitutional" Statutes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1902, 1942-43 & n.154 (1993)
(discussing competing conceptions in ratification debates on the Constitution's
flexibility).
18
See Sherry, supra note 1, at 1178.
19
See id. ("The formal analysis of modern constitutional law is pervaded by the
legacy ofjudicial positivism, which has all but eradicated notions of any link between
constitutional law and natural law.").
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Finally, study of the Case of the Prisoners and its aftermath casts
new light on the issue that, over one hundred years ago, lay at the
core of the initial interest in the early cases and that continues to be
the subject of sharp controversy-the legitimacy of Chief Justice
Marshall's decision in Marbury. Marbury and Marshall have traditionally been viewed in the context of national constitutional
history and national acceptance of judicial review. This Article
argues that they can also profitably be viewed in the context of the
constitutional history of Virginia, Marshall's home state. Much of
the enduring debate about Marbury and Marshall's motives in the
case-and particularly the question whether the Chief Justice
embraced judicial review because he desired a way in which a
Federalist Judiciary could control the Republican Executive and
Congress-reflects the view that judicial review was not established
in this country at the time of the Constitution's ratification. That
view grows in part out of the fact that scholars have previously
devoted much of their focus to the three cases which, before this
Article, appeared to have generated the largest body of surviving
primary source material: Rutgers v. Waddington, 20 Trevett v. Weeden,21 and Bayard v. Singleton. 22 In New York, Rhode Island, and
North Carolina, the states in which these cases were decided, there
was significant opposition to judicial review, suggesting a national
pattern in which judicial review was highly contested. But the Case
of the Prisoners and the subsequent history of judicial review in
Virginia indicate that that statute did not fit that pattern. Although
the court in the Case of the Prisoners did not hold a statute invalid,
and therefore the case is not a precedent for judicial review in the
legal sense, the reaction to the case shows that judicial review did
not provoke serious controversy in the state. Moreover, after the
Case of the Prisoners but before Marbury, the Virginia judiciary
asserted the power to review statutes, and every speaker at the

20
21

N.Y. City Mayor's Ct. 1784, reprinted in 1 GOEBEL, supra note 1, at 393-419.
R.I. 1786, described in VARNUM, supra note 1.

22
I N.C. (Mart.) 48 (1787). The focus on these three cases can be traced back at
least to Brinton Coxe's 1893 study: these were the three cases he treated in detail.
See COXE, supra note 3, at 223-69. More recently, Gordon Wood in The Creation of
the American Republic 1776-1787, the most influential modern revolutionary-era
constitutional history, also focused on these three cases in his treatment of judicial
review. See WOOD, supra note 4, at 453-63. For examples of other studies treating
these cases (or a subset of them) as the most relevant revolutionary-era cases, see
CLINTON, supra note 3, at 48-54; LEVY, supra note 4, at 93-99; STIMSON, supra note 4,
at 110-17; Boudin, supra note 4, at 245-47.
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Virginia ratifying convention (including Marshall) who discussed the
legitimacy of judicial review endorsed it.
This Article suggests that the structure of Virginia's political and
legal culture was such that judicial assertions of the power to
invalidate statutes were accepted as legitimate and that that culture
helps explain why Virginia was the one state in which judicial review
had won broad support well before Marbury. Apart from his
politics, and apart from whether or not there was a consensus at the
time of the framing in favor of judicial review, Marshall was
predisposed to embrace judicial review because he was a product of
that political and legal culture. To put it another way, in MarbU?y,
the Chief Justice was applying the lesson that he had learned over
twenty years before when he heard his former law professor's
judicial opinion in the Case of the Prisoners, and he was ensuring that
the national judiciary had a power that his state's judiciary had long
exercised without challenge.

l. THE CASE OF THE PRISONERS
Facing execution for treason, the three petitioners in the Case
of the Prisoners contended that they had received an effective pardon
from the Virginia House of Delegates and that Virginia's Treason
Act, which provided that an individual could be pardoned only with
the approval of both the House of Delegates and the Virginia
Senate, was void because it was contrary to the state constitution.
This section traces the history of the case, from its background,
through the arguments of the various attorneys who played a part
in the case, the decision of the Virginia Court of Appeals-which, by
a divided vote, ruled against the prisoners-and, finally, the
aftermath of the case. In particular, this section will focus on the
four legal analyses of which a detailed record has been preserved:
the arguments presented by St. George Tucker and Edmund
Randolph before the court of appeals and the opinions of Chancellor George Wythe (one of the two jurists to pronounce in favor of
judicial review) and Chancellor Edmund Pendleton (who reserved
the issue).

A. Background
As the Revolutionary War drew to a close, the Virginia state
government began the systematic prosecution of Virginians who had
been prominent supporters of the Crown during the war. In 1781,
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John Caton, James Lamb, 23 and Joshua Hopkins, the three prisoners in the Case of the Prisoners, had assisted the British troops who
temporarily controlled much of the southeastern part of the state.
They were convicted of treason in separate trials held in Princess
Anne County in May and June 1782, and they were then taken to
Richmond for sentencing. 24 There, on June 15, 1782, the Virginia
General Court sentenced them to death. 25
The three men petitioned the Virginia House of Delegates for
a pardon. The House voted in favor of a resolution that the men
"be and remain Pardoned of the offence of which they are attained, " 26 subject to the condition that they be banished from
Virginia. 27 It then submitted the resolution to the Virginia Senate
for its concurrence, but the Senate voted against issuing the
pardon. 28
On the day that the sheriff was to hang Caton, Lamb, and
Hopkins, the prisoners produced a copy of the House resolution,
without any indication that the resolution had been forwarded to
the Senate or that it had been rejected by that body. 29 The
prisoners claimed that the pardon was valid and entitled them to
their immediate release. 30 Given the absence of any indication as to
how the Senate had treated the petition, the sheriff was apparently
uncertain as to how to proceed. As Chancellor Pendleton put it in
his notes on the case, the sheriff "prudently respited the Execution,
but kept the Prisoners in Goal [sic], until the meeting of the
General Court in October term. " 31
This conjunction of events-the House's approval of a pardon,
the Senate's refusal to concur, and the three men's desperate
attempts to use the House action in order to save their livesobviously was not the product of a plan to create a judicial review
test case. But the fact that the prisoners would implore the general

2
' In his report, Call states that Lamb's first name was John. See Commonwealth
v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 5 (1782). Contemporaneous accounts, however, uniformly
indicate that the defendant's first name was James. See 2 MAYS, supra note 6, at 384
n.l.
24
See 2 MAYS, supra note 6, at 188-89, 384 n.2.
25
See id. at 189.
26
Pendleton, supra note 6, at 416.
27
See Randolph, supra note 8, at 1-2.
28
See Pendleton, supra note 6, at 416; Letter from Edmund Randolph to James
Madison Guly 18, 1782), in 4 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 8, at 422, 424.
29
See Pendleton, supra note 6, at 417.
0
' See id.
'I /d.
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court to overturn a statute was apparent well before arguments were
heard. OnJuly 18, 1782, Attorney General Randolph advised James
Madison, "[a] late incident will probably try the fortitude of our
judiciary, by calling upon them to say, whether a law, contrary to the
constitution, is obligatory. " 32
The Treason Act made it clear that an individual convicted of
treason could only be pardoned with the consent of both houses of
the legislature. That statute provided:
[T]he governor ... shall in no wise have or exercise a right of
granting pardon to any person or persons convicted in manner
aforesaid [including those convicted of treason], but may suspend
the execution until the meeting of the general assembly, who shall
determine whether such person or persons are proper objects of
mercy or not, and order accordingly. 33
Although subsequent developments showed that the statute was
not free from ambiguity, the relevant state constitutional provision
seemed to indicate that, in those circumstances in which the
legislature decided to strip the governor of the pardoning power,
power had to be vested in the House of Delegates alone, rather than
in both houses concurrently. The clause stated:
[The governor] shall, with the advice of the Council of State, have
the power of granting reprieves or pardons, except where the
prosecution shall have been carried on by the House of Delegates,
or the law shall otherwise particularly direct; in which case, no
reprieve or pardon shall be granted, but by resolve of the House
of Delegates. 34
Thus, the state constitution, which had been framed in 1776,
seemed to provide that the House of Delegates alone had the power
to pardon, while the statute, which had been enacted later that year,
clearly established that a resolution by the House of Delegates was
insufficient to effect a pardon and that the agreement of the Senate
was also necessary.
When the general court convened in October 1782, Attorney
General Randolph requested the issuance of a new order for the

~ 2 Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison Quly 18, 1782), in 4 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 422, 424.
~~ An Act Declaring What Shall Be Treason, 1776 Va. Acts ch. III, reprinted in 9
WILLIAM W. HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619,
at 168 (1821).
~• ld. at 115-16.
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execution of the three men. In response, counsel for the prisoners
presented the resolution of the House of Delegates. Unlike the
version given to the sheriff, this copy indicated that the House had
sent the order to the Senate for its concurrence, and the parties
stipulated that the Senate had rejected the pardon. Counsel for the
prisoners argued that under the state constitution the pardon was
valid. Randolph countered that under the governing statute both
houses had to agree to a pardon and that the proffered resolution,
because it lacked the consent of the Senate, was not an effective
pardon. 35 The general court was unsure how to resolve the question whether the act and the constitution were in conflict and, if
they were, whether the court should recognize the pardon issued by
the House of Delegates. Judge Peter Lyons stated that he would
rather resign his judgeship than hold a statute unconstitutional. 36
But his was a minority view. The initial reaction of the majority was
to find in favor of the prisoners on constitutional grounds. "I am
firmly persuaded," Randolph informed Madison, "that the general
court, had the question been taken, would have pronounced the
nullity of the law, as being against the constitution." 37 The court,
however, ultimately decided not to decide the matter at once, but
to adjourn for further consideration of the issue. When it reconvened, the general court again decided not to decide: Rather than
issuing an order, the court determined that in view of its "[n]ovelty
and difficulty" the case should be resolved by the highest court in
the state, the Virginia Court of Appeals. 38

35

See Pendleton, supra note 6, at 417.
Ascription of this comment to Lyons is based on inference. In his opinion for
the court of appeals, Wythe observed that "the other day" one of the judges had said
that "he would sooner quit the bench" than hold a statute void as unconstitutional.
Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 8 (1782). Presumably, Wythe was referring
to a statement made during the course of the general court's proceedings, since all
the opinions in the court of appeals were delivered on the same day. Although there
is apparently no record of the various opinions in the general court, all the general
court members also sat on the court of appeals, and Lyons was the only general court
judge to state that a court could not invalidate a statute. Thus, it appears likely that
Lyons was the judge to whom Wythe was referring and that Lyons had made the
comment when the case was before the general court. See 2 MAYS, supra note 6, at
385 n.12 (noting that Wythe surely referred to Lyons when he described the refusal
of "one of the [general court] judges" to void an act of the Assembly).
37
Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Oct. 26, 1782), in 5 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 217, 217-18.
38
Pendleton, supra note 6, at 417.
36
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B. The Court of Appeals and Initial Proceedings
Established in 1779, the Virginia Court of Appeals was made up
of the sitting judges of the various courts of the state. 39 In 1782,
its membership included the three chancellors of the court of
equity, Edmund Pendleton, George Wythe, and John Blair; the
judges of the general court, Chiefjudge Paul Carrington andjudges
Bartholomew Dandridge, Peter Lyons, and james Mercer; and judge
Richard Cary of the court of admiralty. 40 As the senior judge of
the highest court of the state, the court of equity, Pendleton
presided. 41
There appears to have been sharp debate in political and legal
circles over how the court of appeals should resolve the question
whether a court had power to pronounce a statute void as unconstitutional. The case "made such noise" before it was decided,
Pendleton later wrote to Madison. 42 While their efforts did not
succeed, a group of legislators urged the creation of a joint
legislative-judicial committee to consider whether a court could hold
a statute unconstitutional and to define the powers of the judiciary
and the legislature. These legislators also proposed the creation of
a council of revision "to keep the legislature in futur[ e] cases within
its just limits." 43 Apparently concerned that the court of appeals
would invalidate the statute and that the legislature would then
move to nullify the judiciary's action, Randolph welcomed this
scheme as a way to avoid deadlock and turmoil. "[W]ithout an
accommodation fou[n]ded upon a reasonable construction of the
constitution," he wrote Madison, "the appeal must be made to the
people." 44 So widespread was discussion of the matter before the
court of appeals that a shorthand way of describing judicial review

39

See An Act Constituting the Court of Appeals, 1779 Va. Acts ch. XXII, reprinted
in 10 HENING, supra note 33, at 89, 90. For a discussion of the postrevolutionary
Virginia court system, see Hobson et al., supra note 15, at xxvii-xxxiii.
40
See Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 5 n. *. Ben Waller, the second judge of the court of
admiralty, was entitled to sit on the court of appeals, but consistently refused to do
so because of the travel involved. See Daniel Call, Bio-graphical Sketch of the Judges of
the Court of Appeals, During the Paiod of this and the Succeeding Volumes of Reports, 8 Va.
(4 Call) vii, xx-xxi (1833) (discussing Judge Waller).
41
See Call, supra note 40, at vii-ix (discussing Judge Pendleton).
42
Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Dec. 9, 1782), in 5 MADISO:-<
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 382, 382.
43
Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Oct. 26, 1782), in 5 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 217, 218 (alteration by editors of Madison Papers).
44
ld. (second alteration by editors of Madison Papers).
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developed. In letters and news accounts alike it was described
simply as "the great constitutional question." 45
When the court convened on October 29, 1782, Pendleton
scheduled argument for the 31st, and he said that the judges were
interested in the answers to three questions. The first was jurisdictional-whether the court of appeals could have jurisdiction in a
criminal case. The other two questions concerned judicial review.
Pendleton asked for a discussion of"( w]hether a Court of Law could
declare an Act of the Legislature void because it was repugnant to
the Act for the Constitution of Government?" 46 He also asked for
argument on whether the treason statute was "contrary" to the
pardon clause in the constitution. 47 To assist the members of the
bench in their deliberations, Pendleton "expressed a Wish that the
Gentlemen of the Bar, tho' not engaged as Counsel, would generally
deliver their Sentiments upon the Questions then stated." 48

C. Randolph's Argument
When the court reconvened on October 31st, the first attorney
to argue was Attorney General Randolph, appearing on behalf of
the State. It was to prove a remarkable argument. After the case
was over, he promised Madison, "[a]s soon as I have state[d] the
case in full, you shall receive a copy. " 49 When he failed to fulfill his
commitment promptly, Madison pressed him. "You will not forget
a ... promise which your letter makes with respect [to] the case
lately decided by the Court of Appeals," Madison reminded the
Attorney General on November 19. 50 On December 30, 1782, he
wrote Randolph another letter, which concluded, "You have not I
hope forgot your promise of the case agitated so much in Virga.

45

See, e.g., Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), in
5 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 8, at 260, 261 ("The great constitutional question, as
it was called in our papers .... "); Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison
(Nov. 2, 1782), in 5 MADISON PAPERS, supm note 8, at 230, 230 ("The great
constitutional question, which was mentioned in my last letter .... "); Letter from
Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Oct. 26, 1782), in 5 MADISON PAPERS, supm
note 8, at 217, 217 ("The great constitutional question which I mentioned to you
.... ").
46
Pendleton, supra note 6, at 417.
47 !d.
48 !d.
49
Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), in 5 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 262, 263 (alteration by editors of Madison Papers).
50
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Nov. 19, 1782), in 5
MADISON PAPERS, supm note 8, at 288, 290 (alteration by editors of Madison Papers).
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Mr. Pendleton's state of it has been reed. by Mr. Qoseph Jones, a
fellow member of the Continental Congress from Virginia] and has
increased my curiosity to see yours. " 51 Randolph responded on
January 15, 1783: "I shall certainly transmit a state of the constitutional question and argument, as soon as a mass of papers, now
before me, is reduced. " 52 On February 7, 1783, Randolph sheepishly wrote:
Your favor by yesterday's post would increase my importunity for
a transcript of your extract from Mr. J-s [Gefferson's)] remarks,
if I could assign a better apology for not sending you a state of the
great question, than you can for not sending the transcript. But
circumstanced, as we are in the bosom of urgent business, we must
do these works at leisure. 53
Finally, on March 7, Randolph fulfilled his initial promise, after
a fashion:
Inclosed is a part of my notes on the question before the court of
appeals. Inaccurate as they are (for they were the first rude sketch
& the second is lost) you must content yourself with them. The
remainder which is equally interesting ... shall be sent to you by
the next post, if I can transcribe in time. 54
True to form, Randolph was evidently unable to "transcribe in
time," and it appears that he never sent the remainder of his notes
to Madison. The eleven pages that he sent-the first part of his
initial draft of his argument-have never been published and have
never been used by historians of judicial review. But they are the
only evidence of what is one of the most striking aspects of the Case
of the Prisoners: Advancing a position that was contrary to the

51
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Dec. 30, 1782), in 5 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 4 72, 4 74.
52
Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison Qan. 15, 1783), in 6 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 43, 43.
53
Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Feb. 7, 1783), in 6 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 207, 207-08. Randolph apparently was referring to
Jefferson's memorandum to the Marquis de Barbe-Marbois, on which Madison had
made notes. While that memorandum has not survived, it apparently set forth
Jefferson's view that the Virginia Constitution of 1776 was not a true constitution
because the voters who had elected delegates to the convention that framed the
constitution had not intended them to frame a constitution. See William T.
Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal, Notes to Letter from Edmund Randolph to James
Madison (Mar. 7, 1783), in 6 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 8, at 318, 320 n.7
(discussing Jefferson's memorandum).
54
Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Mar. 7, 1783), in 6 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 318, 319.
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prosecution's interest in upholding the statute, Randolph, the state
attorney general, apparently argued that he believed that a court
had the power to hold a statute void as unconstitutional. He
contended that the statute and the constitution were not inconsistent, and that the House of Delegate's pardon was void because it
was contrary to the statute. Thus, he argued that the court should
not block the prisoners' execution. But the notes indicate that
Randolph argued that, had the legislature passed a statute that was
inconsistent with the constitution, the statute could be declared
void. 55
Randolph's notes are particularly arresting because they bear
evidence of his personal struggle to determine whether judicial
review was valid. Indeed, the revisions that he made to the notes as
he was writing them suggest that, as he worked out the argument,
he reversed his initial position against judicial review. Although the
notes are incomplete, it is a fair inference that he did not in the
remaining part oppose judicial review considering that in the
Federal Constitutional Convention he was one of the handful of
clear proponents of judicial review, 56 listing among the desirable
features of the Virginia Plan that the "natl Judiciary" would be one
of the "Checks upon the Legv. and Ex. Powers. " 57 He repeated
this stance in the Virginia ratifying convention, declaring, that "[i]f
Congress wish [sic] to aggrandise themselves by oppressing the
people, the Judiciary must first be corrupted. "58

55
This Article assumes that Randolph's notes reflect the essence of the argument
that he actually made before the Virginia Court of Appeals. Presumably, if there was
any significant discontinuity, he would have commented on it in his letter forwarding
the notes to Madison, yet he did not. It should be added, however, that Call's report
states that Randolph argued that "the court were [sic] not authorized to declare [the
statute] void." Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 7 (1782). No further details
are provided. Call's report, however, is apparently inaccurate with respect to the
characterization of John Mercer's argument, see infra part I.F., and various judges'
opinions, see infra part I.H. Moreover, the absence of details about Randolph's
argument indicates Call did not have access to Randolph's notes.
56
Scholars have sharply disagreed among themselves as to which members of the
Federal Constitutional Convention endorsed judicial review. Taking a conservative
approach, Levy counts six participants as advocates of judicial review. Randolph is
one of the six. See LEVY, supra note 4, at 103.
57
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 28.
In addition, with respect to the proposal that Congress has the power to block state
laws, Randolph suggested, as an accommodation to the small states, that states have
the right to appeal congressional decisions to the national judiciary, which would have
the power to hold congressional negatives "void." 3 id. at 56.
58
9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
1101 Gohn P. Kaminiski & Gasparej. Saladino eds., 1990) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY
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In the notes, after stating the facts of the case, Randolph began
his legal argument by attempting to show that the statute and the
constitution were not in conflict. He started by articulating his
premise that the rules appropriate for construing a constitution
were different from those appropriate for construing a statute. "In
the former," he wrote:
the liberality, necessary to catch its spirit, must be adopted.
In the latter, the masculine force of substantial sense is too
often subjected to the petty tyranny of grammatical rule.
The cause of this distinction seems to be, that
l. the constitution describes general outlines only; whereas a law
proposes the detail ... [crossed out material]
In a word, the constitution cannot avoid a generality of terms, lest
it should omit a part of that infinity of combination, of which the
affairs of society are capable-whereas a law touches single subjects
only. 59

Randolph then sought to show that the constitution-interpreted
in accordance with the "principle of liberality" 60-did not bar the
Senate from participating in the pardoning process. Commenting
on the fact that the constitution specifically provided the House of
Delegates with the power to pardon in cases of impeachment,
Randolph wrote, "[E]very argument which tends to the propriety of
uniting [the Senate] in pardoning in these instances [of impeachments], will prove the great improbability of their exclusion being
intended in any other." 61 Randolph thus specifically invoked
framers' intent. But, as his argument made clear, he was not
appealing to any specific evidence of subjective intent. Rather,
intent was to be determined by looking at the structure of government established by the constitution, the nature of the governmen-

HISTORY]. It should be added that, if Randolph, in the part of the notes that has not
survived, did declare his opposition to judicial review, this Article's contention that
judicial review won early acceptance in Virginia would not be undermined. That
acceptance is amply evidenced by the fact that the decision in the Case of the Prisoners
did not provoke controversy, that all the speakers in the state constitutional
convention to take a position on judicial review were in favor of it, and by early state
case law. See infra part I.I, II.B. That the Attorney General announced his support
for judicial review in a case in which he was also urging that a statute be upheld
simply highlights the larger phenomenon.
09
Randolph, supra note 8, at 3. As will be discussed below, Randolph originally
listed three points under this heading. He then crossed out the second and third.
See infra text accompanying notes 75-76.
60
Randolph, supra note 8, at 4.
61 ld.
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tal institutions implicated, and by what common sense would
indicate the framers intended.
In advancing his argument, Randolph first attempted to show
why, under the British Constitution, it was proper to deny the King
the power to pardon in cases of impeachment. He sketched the
monarch's broad powers, and then stated, "As often as this
formidable being shall offend against his country, his servants are
considered as his wicked advisers and must suffer. Were he then
permitted to cast a shield over them in defiance of the prosecution
of the people, their security against his tyranny would be greatly
diminished. " 62
In contrast, Randolph saw no reason to bar the Virginia Senate
from a role in granting pardons in cases of impeachment. He
asked, "[I]s a Virginian Senate armed with these fangs or these
horrors [which the King possessed]? Have they separate interests
from the Delegates?" 63 He answered by noting that membership
in the Senate was not hereditary, that the senators were elected by
the people, that they could not originate bills or amend money bills,
and that the senators were not "by their powers as much of
aristocracy as would hang on an aspin [sic]leaf." 64 He also noted
that under the constitution the senators were clearly incapable of
issuing pardons without the approval of the House of Delegates.
Randolph concluded that "[i]n the eyes of political wisdom," the
House of Delegates had no grounds to fear a Senate role in the
pardoning power in cases of impeachment. 5 5
If there was no reason to deny the Senate a role in pardoning in
cases of impeachment, Randolph stated that "[s]till less is to be
apprehended from their interference in other cases." 66 He did not
develop this point at length, but simply argued that there was no
reason why the case of treason was so unique that the Senate should
not have a role in pardoning those convicted of it: "[Treason]
strikes as deep into the happiness of the Senate as citizens, and
their existence as a body. Their judgment will be as keen, and
irritation vs. the offense as acute [as that of the House of Delegates]."67

62

!d.
!d.
He then
64 !d.
65 !d.
66
!d.
67 !d.
63

at 5.
Randolph originally wrote: "Have they separate interests from the people?"
crossed out "people" and wrote in "Delegates."

at 6.
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"These considerations," Randolph wrote, "are designed to open
the way for reconciling by construction the law with the constitution. For if [the constitution's] spirit opposes the exclusion of the
Senate, its words must be free from ambiguity and decided, or
cannot have the supremacy. " 68 In other words, Randolph believed
that the constitution should be construed in light of the political
philosophy underlying the document. When a statute was challenged on constitutional grounds, and the statute was consistent
with the philosophy of the constitution, the statute was constitutional unless contrary to express and unambiguous constitutional
dictates.
Randolph then proposed a series of ways in which the court
could interpret the constitution so as to find the statute valid. The
first "solution" he offered was that the court should treat the phrase
"or the law shall otherwise particularly direct" in the pardon clause
of the constitution as if it were in parentheses. 69 Thus, the
constitution would provide that, in the case of prosecutions
conducted by the House of Delegates, only the House of Delegates
could issue pardons. In the case of other prosecutions, the
legislature could provide any method of pardoning that it desired. 70
"Perhaps a better interpretation," Randolph continued, was
reading the constitutional clause to hold that the House of Delegates had to assent to a pardon, but not as holding it to bar the
additional requirement that the Senate had to concur with the
House. 71
Finally, Randolph suggested that the Treason Act
represented a determination by the House of Delegates that it
wanted the Senate to participate in the pardoning process. The
statute, rather than being a derogation from the power of the House
of Delegates, merely embodied that body's decision as to how it
wanted to exercise its pardoning power under the constitution.
Randolph asked:
[S]hall the delegates be forbidden to call in assistance the
judgment of the Senate? And if they have declared, that the
pardon of treason is too important for their decision, what injury

68
69
70

71

/d.
/d. at 7.
See id.
/d.
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can arise from their admitting the Senate so far, as to say, that
they will not pardon without their concurrence?72
Randolph then turned to the "two awful contemplations" that
the court would be forced to consider if it rejected his contention
that the statute and the constitution could be reconciled: "1. Is the
treason law to be declared void, so far as it is repugnant to the
constitution? 2. If it can be declared void, can any court of
judicature pronounce its nullity?" 73
Randolph had seemingly already stated his position on these
questions. At the start of his notes, in setting forth the position of
the state in the case, Randolph asserted, "[I]n the volume of the law
... we believe to be written ... that, howsoever adverse the law
which vests this [pardoning] power in the general assembly may be
to the constitution, no court of judicature can pronounce its
nullity. " 74
Moreover, in comparing constitutions and statutes at the
beginning of his notes, Randolph originally wrote that "the
constitution is intended, as a rule for the governors-a law for the
rule of the governed. " 75 He also wrote that "the constitution
delegates to the legislature every power of the people, except that
of opposition-a law only draws into action certain portions of that
power. " 76 Both points suggest that the function of the constitution
is merely hortatory, as far as the legislature is concerned, and that
the constitution imposes no constraints on a legislature that wishes
to disregard constitutional dictates. Thus, the legislature possesses
"every power of the people," and the constitution is a "law" for the
people, but merely a "rule" for the legislature. The only powers
that the people retain are those of "opposition," presumably the
powers to vote the legislature out or to revolt. This position
paralleled Blackstone's view of parliamentary supremacy: the

72

/d. at 8.
/d. The first question, from its context, poses the question whether judicial
review is legitimate. The logical subject of "declared" in the first question is the
court, because it is the court that is to answer the question, "Is the treason law to be
declared void, so far as it is repugnant to the constitution?" Randolph's second
question appears to pose the jurisdictional issue raised in the case, which is not
resolved in the part of the notes that survives. In other words, "If it can be declared
void, can any court ofjudicature pronounce its nullity?" poses the question whether
the general court alone can nullify a criminal statute or whether the court of appeals
possesses that power as well.
74
/d. at 2.
"/d. at 3.
76 /d.
73
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Virginia legislature, like the parliament, is the supreme law-giver. 77
At some point, however, Randolph apparently decided to reject
this position. In revising the draft, he lined out the two distinctions
between statutes and the constitution just discussed. And, after he
demonstrated that the legislation and the constitution were not
inconsistent, he declared himself in favor of judicial review. It is
unclear whether, as he began drafting his notes, Randolph originally
intended to argue against judicial review. But as he eventually set
forth his ideas on judicial review, he made clear that his position
was not the position of the Commonwealth. In stating his initial
rejection of judicial review, Randolph used the word "we." In
setting forth his arguments in favor of judicial review, however, he
carefully ascribed the position to himself. 78
Randolph declared himself in favor of judicial review in a
fashion that was both dramatic and that conveyed the difficulty that
he felt in adopting this position. After having informed the court
that, if it found the statute and constitution inconsistent, it would
have to resolve the difficult questions whether a statute inconsistent
with the constitution was void and whether any court had the power
to so find, Randolph said:
Here let me pause.
But why pause?
Do I tremble at the decision of my own mind, that a law
against the constitution may be declared void? or I [sic] do I
dread the resentment of the court, when I bear testimony against
their competency to pronounce the invalidity of the law?
No! The revolution has given me a coat of mail for my
defense, while I adhere to its principles. That bench too is reared
on the revolution, and will arrogate no undue power.
I hold then, that every law against the constitution may be
declared void. 79

He told the court that his sense of duty led him to argue as he did.
"On this head," he wrote, "you [are] perceiving that [I] argue in

77
Blackstone maintained that "the supreme and absolute authority of the state ...
is vested by our constitution" in Parliament. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
147 (Edward Christian ed., Thomas B. Wait & Co. 1807) (1765). For a more
complete discussion of Blackstone's view of parliamentary supremacy, see generally
id. at 145-89 (chapter on parliament and its powers).
78
See Randolph, supra note 8, at 9-11 (making reference to "I" and "me" when
discussing judicial review).
79
ld. at 9.
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favor of the criminals: my office does not extinguish that respect,
which I shall owe to the constitution, as long as it remains such. " 80
Randolph then expounded upon the significance of a constitution and what a constitution was. "Take a people," he began, "who
have either never yet entered into a formal social compact, or
having abolished an old one are about to conclude another." 81
Such a people would have differing ideas of how government should
be structured and what their role in it was to be. One faction would
desire "the uncontrouled command of an emperor." 82 Another
faction, "equally outrageous in their thirst for unlimited sovereignty,
but conscious of their own individual capacity to govern, will form
one common phalanx, and cry aloud for aristocracy," while some of
this group "fancying themselves formed of purer clay, and enjoying
a higher portion of aetherial spirit, than their companions, may rise
to the claim of oligarchy." 83 A third faction would seek "fair
equality" and "the boisterous ocean of plebian rule," while a fourth
faction, "more moderate-demonstrably more wise," would "labour
for the erection of a system, sharing the good, and shunning the
vices of the others. " 84
Randolph asked the court to imagine a legislature composed of
members of these various factions:
[H]ow could laws, whose object is public happiness, be enacted
subservient to this end, without a touchstone, by which to
ascertain the degree of restraint or countenance, which may be
given to each of the simple forms of government[?]
Without [a constitution] it cannot be decided how far the
people, the fountain of power, have chosen to deposit it in the
hands of their legislative servants, nor determine, when the right
of resistance commences. 85

To avoid legislative abuse of power and to avoid chaos, a
constitution was necessary. Randolph defined a constitution as
[a] compact, in which the people themselves are the sole parties
and which they alone can abrogate, delineating the degree, to
which they have parted with legislative, executive and judiciary

80
81
82

83
84

85

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.

at 11.
at 9.
at 10.

at 10-11.
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power, as well as prescribing how far each of the simple forms of
government is to be pursued in acts of legislation. 86

Randolph's notes end abruptly as he turned to rebut a Blackstonian conception of legislative supremacy. They conclude: "That
we have a constitution in my sense of the word, will not, I presume,
be controverted-But an objection has been made against the
permanency of a constitution from the changes, which laws have
made in European governments, and especially in England. "87 The
remainder of his notes has apparently not been preserved.

D. Analysis of Randolph's Argument
In light of then-reigning legal and political orthodoxies,
Randolph's notes are a remarkable document in several respects (in
addition to his use of original intent, which has already been noted
and will be discussed in greater detail later). Most important, they
very clearly set forth a vision of a constitution as an agreement
among the people-a social compact. The classic English Whig
conception of a constitution was the very different notion of an
agreement between ruler and ruled. This Whig notion informed the
rhetoric of the Revolution-the King, it was maintained, had violated
his agreement with his people. 88 This notion also informed
constitution-making at the start of the revolutionary era. As
Gordon Wood has written, the state constitutions "were still
identified in the minds of many with their old colonial charters, as
contracts between magistrates and people, defining and delimiting
the powers and rights of each. "89
By the time the Federal Constitution was ratified, the social
compact conception of constitutions had displaced the notion of
constitution as compact between ruled and ruler. Government had
become a creature of the compact, rather than a party to it. 90 This
new conception, in turn, provided a basis for judicial review. Thus,
on the eve of the constitutional convention, James Iredell argued
that judicial review was proper because judges were merely ensuring
that the legislature did not exceed the limits of the delegation of
power that it had received from the people. 91 Both Alexander

86
87
88
89

90
91

/d. at 11.
/d.
See WOOD, supra note 4, at 268-70.
/d. at 271.
See id. at 600-01 (tracing the evolution of compact theory).
See James Iredell, To the Public (1786), in 2 GRIFFITH j. MCREE, LIFE AND
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Hamilton's Federalist No. 7892 and James Wilson's Lectures on Law, 93
as well as Marbury, 94 defend judicial review in similar fashion.
Randolph's notes suggest that he had come to a similar position
earlier. Clearly, he thought of a constitution as a compact among
the people-he explicitly stated as such in his definition of a constitution. Moreover, this conception of a constitution seems to have
been underlying his position that "a law against the constitution may
be declared void. " 95 A constitution is a "touchstone"; the constitution allows the determination of "how far the people, the fountain
of power, have chosen to deposit it in the hands of their legislative
servants. " 96 Randolph seems to be moving toward the position
that courts can review legislation for constitutionality because such
review, rather than representing an aggrandizement of power by the
judiciary, merely involves judicial enforcement of the boundaries
created by the people when they adopted the constitution.
Like the notes of his argument, the letter that Randolph sent
Madison along with his notes also bears witness to this notion of the
constitution as a compact among the people that the legislature
cannot legitimately violate. In that letter, Randolph took issue with

CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 145, 145-46 (1857) (noting that the power of the
legislature is constrained by the Constitution); Letter from James Iredell to Richard
Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), in 2 McREE, supra, at 172 (elaborating on his theory of
judicial review).
92
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464,467-68 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961). Hamilton noted:
There is no position which depends on clearer principles than that every act
of a delegated authority, contrary to the teilor of the commission under
which it is exercised, is void .... [W]henever a particular statute contravenes
the Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the
latter and disregard the former.
/d.
93

1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 329-30 (Robert McCloskey ed., 1967). Wilson

noted:
In consequence of[the Constitution], the bounds of the legislative power-a
power most apt to overleap its bounds-are not only distinctly marked in a
system itself; but effectual and permanent provision is made, that every
transgression of those bounds shall be adjudged and rendered vain and
fruitless.
/d.
9
' 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175-80 (1803) ("If then the courts are to regard the
constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the
constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both
apply.").
95
Randolph, supra note 8, at 9.
96
/d. at 11.
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Jefferson's conception of the Virginia Constitution, a conception
apparently enunciated in a memorandum to the Marquis de BarbeMarbois, a summary of which Randolph had received. Jefferson
would later develop this conception in his Notes on the State of
Virginia. 97 Jefferson argued that the convention that framed the
Virginia Constitution was elected at the start of the Revolutionary
War for the sole purpose of governing the state; the people had not
vested that convention with the power to enact a constitution, and
future legislatures were therefore under no obligation to comply
with the constitution that the convention enacted. Thus, Jefferson
argued, statutes could legitimately contravene constitutional provisions. In addition, Jefferson pointed out that in the revolutionary
era legislative transgressions on constitutional dictates were not only
legitimate, they were frequent in occurrence. 98 Rejecting these
positions, Randolph wrote:
Mr. J-n has truly stated the modes, in which the Constitution
was formed. But he ought to have added, that the people
expected at the time of the election of the convention, that they
were to be vested with power, of every sort, necessary for political
happiness altho' perhaps independence was not a reigning
opinion; that they confirmed it by executing it: and that the
incroachments, made on it by the assembly, have proceeded either
from inadvertency, or emergencies. For it is notorious that they
constantly profess a sacred regard to the constitution. 99

At the same time, Randolph did not suggest that the exercise of
judicial review was a mechanical operation. In presenting his
arguments to the court about the construction of the constitution's
provision of pardoning, Randolph effectively acknowledged that the
reading he was urging was not the only permissible one. He made
clear that an ambiguous constitutional provision should be construed in light of the principles underlying the document as a whole
and in recognition of the importance of giving effect to legislative
pronouncements. Thus, he declared, "For if [the constitution's]

97
Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia ( 1787), reprinted in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 123 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
98
See Hutchinson & Rachal, supra note 8, at 320 n.7 (noting that "[d]uring the
Revolution, the Virginia General Assembly had frequently transgressed [the
constitution] and legally could have rescinded it altogether"); Jefferson, supra note 97,
at 246-51 (adhering to the view that the Constitution could be altered by acts of the
legislature).
99
Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Mar. 7, 1783), in 6 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 318, 319.
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spirit opposes the exclusion of the Senate, its words must be free
from ambiguity and decided, or cannot have the supremacy." 100
Such a statement reflects a conception of judicial review
involving a marked degree of deference to the legislature. But
Randolph's conception of judicial review was even more deferential
than such a statement suggests, since the "ambiguity" in the
constitution's pardoning provision was largely Randolph's handiwork. The constitutional clause seems to provide that where the
executive was stripped of the pardoning power, the House of
Delegates alone would have the power to pardon. Randolph created
ambiguity by offering a number of strained readings of the
constitutional text. As he privately admitted in one of his letters to
Madison concerning the case, "I doubt not, that to any but lawyers
the construction, by which the two [statute and constitutional
provisions] were reconcile[ d,] would appear unix·,telligible." 101
It may also be significant that Randolph decided not to be fully
candid about the extent of deference that he thought appropriate
in this case. In other words, he did not tell the court that he
believed that a statute should be upheld if there were any reading
of the constitution-no matter how strained and unintelligible to the
layman-that would sustain it. This suggests that Randolph believed
that it was important that statements of the principle of judicial
review should not be too weak. Randolph appears to have thought
for prudential reasons that the court should not overturn the
Treason Act. Thus, when the decision was handed down, he wrote
Madison that the court had avoided a determination whether a law
could be declared void and that "[t]here surely was prudence in the
path, which they took." 102 But he also apparently believed that the
legislature should not be granted teo wide a latitude, and that it was
important not to acknowledge the extent to which prudential
concerns would lead courts to uphold legislative actions inconsistent
with constitutional provisions.
As they did with respect to the idea of a constitution,
Randolph's notes indicate that he had moved away from the dominant modes of thought at the outbreak of the Revolution with

100

Randolph, supra note 8, at 6.
Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), in 5 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 262, 263. Randolph was referring to the court's decision, but
since the court adopted his reading, the comment is equally applicable to Randolph's
own argument.
102 !d.
101
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respect to faith in legislatures. At the start of the Revolution,
Republican thinkers had believed that the legislature would be
uniquely able to perceive and then advance the common good. 103
Randolph's picture of the legislature is markedly different. For
Randolph, in the absence of a constitution, the legislature would be
comprised of advocates of tyranny, aristocratic rule, and mob rule;
those who discern the common good and seek to take from various
systems a new system "sharing the good, and shunning the vices of
the others" are but one group among many. 104 Governance by
such a legislature would produce chaos and each undesirable system
of government would leave its stamp on the polity:
"[C]ivil
institutions might be directed at different periods of the day to the
support of the different principles of government . . . . This would
leave a great multitude constantly murmuring and this mixture
would give a truly pantomime govt to a code of laws." 105
Randolph never stated that the actual Virginia legislature was
subject to the same weaknesses as his hypothetical legislature, but
his meaning was clear: unless subject to constitutional checks, a
state legislature would combine all the flaws that could characterize
a government not subject to the checks imposed by balanced
government. It would be, by turns, characterized by the worst
aspects of mob rule, tyranny, and oligarchy, and would evidence a
lack of stability.
In contrast, the bench was, in Randolph's view, dispassionate,
above the fray, and able to act in accordance with the most valued
principles of republican government. Thus, he stated, "the revolution has given me a coat of mail for my defense, while I adhere to
its principles. That bench too is reared on the revolution, and will
arrogate no undue power." 106
Randolph's acceptance of judicial review was thus based in
significant part on his rejection of notions of institutional capacity
that had animated the revolutionaries of 1776. They had placed
their faith in the legislature as a body capable of articulating and
defending republican values, while denigrating the judiciary as

10
' See WOOD, supra note 4, at 162-73 (discussing early perceptions of representa·
tive legislatures); William M. Treanor, Note, The 01·igins and Original Significance of
the just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE LJ 694, 701-02 ( 1985)
(asserting that "[a]s the voice of the people, the legislature could be trusted to
perceive the common good and to define the limits of individual rights").
104
Randolph, supra note 8, at 10.
105
ld. at 11.
106
ld. at 9.
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subject to the same antipopular tendencies as the executive.
Randolph, in contrast, feared the legislature and placed his faith in
the judiciary's adherence to revolutionary principles; this view is
reflected in his embrace of judicial review. His willingness to
concede the legitimacy in principle of judicial review in a case in
which he was arguing to uphold a statute suggests a point that will
be subsequently developed-judicial review early won surprisingly
broad acceptance in Virginia.

E. Argument for the Prisoners
Andrew Ronald appeared on behalf of Caton, Lamb, and
Hopkins. 107 Ronald contended that the meaning of the constitution was clear: "[T]he power of pardoning belonged to the house
of delegates. " 108 He urged the court to reject Randolph's claim
that the constitution's pardoning clause should be construed in light
of framers' intent: "[T]he words of the constitution, and not conjectures drawn from the supposed meaning of the framers of it, should
give the rule. " 109 According to Ronald, judicial review of statutes
was not only a proper judicial function, it compelled rejection of the
treason statute. "[T]he act of assembly was contrary to the plain
declaration of the constitution; and therefore void." 110 Ronald
also argued that to the extent that the constitution was ambiguous,
"the construction ought, in favour of life, to incline to the side of
mercy." 111
In addition, Ronald offered the court a way to resolve the case
in favor of his clients without determining whether the exercise of
judicial review was legitimate. He contended that the constitution's
pardoning provision and the statutory pardoning provision were not
inconsistent: both provisions made a separate grant of the pardoning power. Thus, the constitution gave the House of Delegates the
power to pardon independently, while the treason statute gave the
two houses of the legislature the power to pardon jointly. A par-

107

In his reports, Call states that the cause of the prisoners was argued by "Mr.
Hardy and several other distinguished gentlemen." Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va.
(4 Call) 5, 6 (1782). Mays speculates that the Mr. Hardy referred to was Samuel
Hardy, a young Virginia lawyer. See 2 MAYS, supra note 6, at 194. Pendleton's notes
state that Ronald was counsel for the prisoners. See Pendleton, supra note 6, at 417.
108
Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 7.
109 !d.
110 !d.
Ill Jd.
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don granted in either fashion was valid. He analogized the case to
a situation in which a right could be conferred by common law or
by statute. The prisoners should have been released because they
had secured a pardon in one of the two ways in which a pardon
could be issued. 112

F. Amicus Advocates
In addition to the representatives of the parties, the court heard
from three men who responded to Pendleton's call for argument
from interested members of the Virginia Bar: John Francis Mercer,
brother of Judge James Mercer and a future member of Maryland's
delegation to the Constitutional Convention; 113 William Nelson,
who later became a judge of the Virginia General Court and a
professor of law at William and Mary; 114 and the man who would
eventually achieve the greatest eminence of the three, St. George
Tucker. Tucker would become a member of the Virginia General
Court, and then the court of appeals, a federal district court judge,
and professor of law at William and Mary (where he was Wythe's
successor and Nelson's predecessor). 115 Most important, he was
the editor and author of Blackstone's Commentaries: With Notes of
Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the
United States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia. 116 This work
included not only Tucker's notes on Blackstone's work, but lengthy
appendices that he wrote on federal and state law. Charles Cullen,
Tucker's biographer, has written:
Until the introduction of the case method of teaching law in the
late nineteenth century commentaries and treatises were actually
the only texts or references students and lawyers had for studying
American law, and St. George Tucker's Blackstone was the only
summary of similar dimensions available until Chancellor James
Kent of New York began publishing his Commentaries on Ame1·ican

112

See Pendleton, supra note 6, at 418.
See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1774-1989,
S. Doc. No. 34, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1490-91 (1989).
114
See Carrington, supra note 11, at 540-41.
115
See CULLEN, supra note 8, at 188-89. Cullen's biography is the most detailed
scholarly study of Tucker's career, although it ends with his appointment to the
Virginia Court of Appeals. See generally MARY COLEMAN, ST. GEORGE TUCKER:
CITIZEN OF No MEAN CITY (1938) (biography focusing on Tucker's personal life).
116
See TUCKER, supra note 1.
113
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Law in 1826. No other American edition of Blackstone could
compare with Tucker's until 1852 .... 117

Until the appearance of Kent's Commentaries, Tucker was the
commentator most frequently cited by the Supreme Court and the
counsel who appeared before it. 118 He became known as the
"American Blackstone." 119
Call indicates that all the lawyers who appeared as amici argued
on behalf of the prisoners. 120 Pendleton states that these lawyers
"differ(ed] amongst themselves in several points, particularly as to
the Power of the Court to declare an Act of Assembly void in any
case. " 121 It appears that Nelson and Tucker, at least, both argued
in favor of judicial review. Apart from the brief summaries in Call's
and Pendleton's accounts, the only apparent surviving record of any
of the amici's arguments is Tucker's notes. Tucker's notes, which
will be discussed below, make clear that he argued in favor of the
prisoners and in favor of judicial review. The notes are in the form
of a letter "To W. N. Esq." and Tucker indicated in the margin that
they were originally prepared as an argument to be read by "my
friend Wm. Nelson who proposed to appear in behalf of the
prisoners. " 122 Apparently, when Tucker arrived in Court, he
found that Nelson had already drafted his own comments. Nelson
suggested that Tucker deliver his own remarks, and the latter
did. 123 Presumably, then, Tucker and Nelson were in essential
agreement on the positions that they took. Mercer, in contrast,
likely argued against judicial review since, when he attended the
Federal Constitutional Convention as a Maryland representative, he
stated that "(h]e disapproved of the Doctrine that the Judges as
expositors of the Constitution should have authority to declare a law
void. He thought laws ought to be well and cautiously made, and
then to be uncontroulable." 124

CULLEN, mpra note 8, at 162.
See id. at 163 & n.77 (noting that Tucker's Blackstone was cited 19 times in
opinions and arguments by counsel).
119
J. Randolph Tucker, The judges Tucker of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1 VA.
L. REG. 789, 793 ( 1896).
120
See Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 5 (1782).
121
Pendleton, supra note 6, at 418.
122
Tucker, supra note 8. This comment is on the jacket of the notes.
12
' See id.
124
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 298.
1!7
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G. Tucker's Argument
Tucker's notes are, with Randolph's, apparently the oldest
surviving revolutionary-era document discussing judicial review, and
the complexity and detail of the analysis make Tucker's notes of
particular value as an historical document. Unlike Randolph's,
Tucker's argument is fully preserved. Also unlike Randolph, Tucker
did not advance a conception of judicial review that reflected
judicial deference to the legislature. Tucker's argument merits
recognition as being of intellectual force equal to the famous
defenses of judicial review that James Iredell, 125 Alexander Hamilton, 126 and James Wilson 127 were subsequently to develop. The
two aspects of his argument that merit particular scrutiny are his
justification for judicial review and his conception of constitutional
construction.
Tucker began by invoking the provision of the Virginia Bill of
Rights under which "the Executive and Legislative powers of the
state should be separate and distinct from the Judiciary" and the
parallel provision of the state constitution barring each branch from
exercising the powers of another. 128 The relevant question thus
became what the judicial function was. Tucker did not, however,
treat this subject as one over which people could differ. "Now I
hold it to be uncontrovertible," he said, "that the power properly
belonging to the Judiciary Department, is, to explain the Laws of
the Land as they apply to particular cases. " 129 That this power of
applying the laws to specific cases was vested exclusively in the
judiciary was a necessary restraint on legislative tyranny. He
invoked Montesquieu for the proposition that "the same Man or
body of men should not enact Laws, or afterwards carry them into
execution, for in this case [Montesquieu] observes arbitrary Laws
may first be made and then tyrannically executed, or interpreted. " 130 "[T]his," Tucker added, "is also the spirit of our Constitu-

125
See Iredell, supra note 91; Letter from james Iredell to Richard Spaight (Aug.
26, 1787), in 2 MCREE, supra note 91, at 172.
126
See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 92.
127
See 1 THE WORKS OF jAMES WILSON, supra note 93, at 329-30. Wilson lectured
that it is tbe right and duty of a court of justice to void any legislative act repugnant
to the constitution.
128
Tucker, supra note 8, at 2-3.
129
/d. at 3.
1 0
' /d. at 4.
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tion .... [T]he Judiciary ... are by the Constitution appointed as a
counterpoise to [the legislature]." 131
Having developed the proposition that application of the law to
individual cases was an exclusively judicial function, Tucker asserted
"it follows that [the judiciary] alone (if any of the Departments of
Government can do it) can decide what is or is not Law, and
consequently (I should presume) on the validity or nullity of
different Laws contradicting each other." 132 When the conflict
was between a statute and the constitution, the constitution had
precedence because it was the "Bulwark of the Liberties of the
Citizens of this Commonwealth ... as framed agreeable to their Bill
of Rights which is declared to be the Basis and Foundation of
Government." 133 Tucker continued:
Under this Idea I conceive the Constitution not Iyable to any
alteration whatsoever by the Legislative, without destroying that
Basis and Foundation of Government.
For altho' it be true that the Judges are sworn to decide in all
matters brought before them agreeably to the Laws of the Land,
yet as the Constitution (is] the first Law by which they are bound,
and any Decision contrary thereto is absolutely subversive of that
Government of which it is undoubtedly the Basis and Foundation. 134

This part of his argument for judicial review is based on a
separation of powers theory. Judicial review is justified as simply an
exercise of the judicial function of deciding what law to apply to a
particular case. In other words, when the constitution and a statute
dictate different results in a case, the court must choose between
them, and its first obligation is to the constitution.
Significantly, this separation of powers argument has two
different and independent bases. One is Montesquieu, and the
other is the state constitution. Tucker invokes Montesquieu as
standing for the general proposition that it invites tyranny to have
the lawmaker also be the law interpreter. 135 The most important

ld.
m ld. at 5.
m ld. at 6.
IS< Jd.
m Tucker did not cite a specific section of Montesquieu, but his reference is
presumably to the chapter in The Spirit of the Laws on the English Constitution, the
chapter that most profoundly influenced the Framers of the United States Constitution. See MJ.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 84-86
lSI
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point to recognize about this argument is that it is extraconstitutional: it indicates that judicial review would be appropriate even
in the absence of constitutional text providing for separation of
powers.
The alternative separation of powers argument-the constitutional argument-draws on very open-ended constitutional text.
Tucker's reference to the Virginia Bill of Rights is a reference to
section five, which states in relevant part: "That the Executive and
Legislative powers of the state should be separate and distinct from
the Judiciary. " 136 Since the concept of the judiciary as a separate
branch of government was relatively novel, 137 the term "Judiciary"
did not have a fixed meaning. Tucker's statement, "This is also the
Spirit of the Constitution, " 138 implicitly recognizes this with its
invocation of the "spirit," not the letter, of the constitution.
Tucker acknowledged that Parliament was not constrained by
the British Constitution, but stated, "[N]o parallel can possibly be
drawn between the Constitution of [Great Britain] and this
Country." 139 The Magna Carta, the Habeas Corpus Act, and the
British Bill of Rights were all "constitutional acts," but they "have
been altered by the British Parliament, more than once." 140 Such
alteration reflected the fact that
some of the ablest Politicians of that nation [Great Britain]
considered [these statutes] only as Acts explanatory of that
Constitution, which has existed to use their own phrase from times
beyond the memory of man; and that all the Rights and Priviledges
[sic] therein set forth were the inherent and indefeasible Rights of
Englishmen equally as if those Acts explaining them had never
been made. 141

Under this view, since the constitutional acts were considered
merely declaratory of the constitution, parliamentary amendment of

( 1967) (discussing Montesquieu 's chapter on the English Constitution and its effect
on the evolution of the separation of powers doctrine). In that chapter-which is
chapter 6 of part 2, book 11-Montesquieu wrote: "Nor is there liberty if the power
of judging is not separate from legislative power. ... If it were joined to legislative
power, the power over the life and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the
judge would be the legislator." CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
THE LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., 1989) (1748).
lS6 VA. CONST. of 1776, art. I, § 5.
137
See WOOD, supra note 4, at 159-60.
158
See supra text accompanying note 131.
159
Tucker, supra note 8, at 7.
140 ld.
141
Id. at 7.
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them was seen as merely correcting previous misstatements about
the meaning of the constitution. An alteration of one of the
constitutional statutes "is only considered as placing what really was
the Constitution in it's [sic] proper light." 112 Tucker added that
the view that Parliament was not thereby altering the British
Constitution was a "Fiction in Law," noting that "the British
Constitution may be modelled agreeably to the will of Parliament,
whose omnipotence in this Instance seems generally admitted. " 143
Tucker contrasted the Virginia Constitution with the British
Constitution. The two were different in every critical aspect:
[T]he British is constructive-Ours is express-the British is
traditional; and different points of it have been explained at
different times, and by different parliaments and in different
modes. Ours on the contrary was framed with all the solemnity of
an original Compact between the Citizens about to establish a
Government most agreeable to themselves. That it might not be
liable to be infringed it is founded on a Bill of Rights which is
declared to form the Basis and Foundation of Government; and
that it might not be misinterpreted it was committed to writing
and made public to all the Citizens who became parties thereto.I44

The British Constitution evolves and is subject to judicial reinterpretation. In contrast, the Virginia Constitution was for
Tucker, as it was for Randolph, the original compact. For Tucker,
one implication that followed from the Virginia Constitution's status
as original compact was that its meaning was fixed.
This stress on the constitution as original compact exists in
tension with the Montesquieu-based argument for separation of
powers. The former rests on the notion that the basis of law is
positivist: law, and specifically constitutional law, is created by the
people as they enact the original compact. To the extent that it is
based, not on the constitution, but on the principle that it risks
tyranny to have the lawmaker be the law-interpreter, the separation
of powers argument indicates that there is a source of law external
to the positivist constitution: judges are empowered to review
statutes, not because the people have given them that power, but
because they must do so if liberty is to be preserved.

142
H3
144

!d. at 8.
fd.
!d. at 8-9.
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Having offered his explanation of the nature of the Virginia
Constitution, Tucker stated, without apparently feeling the need for
elaboration or defense, that the judiciary was entrusted with the
protection of the constitution: "Here then [in the constitution] are
explained those Fundamental Principles of our Government, of
which the Judiciary Department is constituted the Guardian." 145
Tucker's language here is significant. His choice of the word
"Guardian" suggests that protection of the constitution is a
peculiarly judicial role, rather than a responsibility shared among
the branches.
The point that troubled Jefferson-the fact that the convention
that enacted the Virginia Constitution had not been elected for that
purpose-was not addressed by Tucker, but he did offer two
explanations for why the legislature's acts were subject to constitutional limits. First, since the legislature was the creature of the
constitution, it logically did not have the authority to alter the
document that called it into being: "For the Constitution being the
Act of the political Legislature and in nature of an original Compact
between the Citizens of the Commonwealth ... an inferior or
subordinate Institution can not have power to annul or avoid any
part of the Constitution so established. " 146 Second, the people did
not understand the legislature to have the power to act in a way that
was inconsistent with the constitution: "[T]here is no proposition
in nature more generally admitted, than the Opinion is received
[sic] in this Commonwealth, that no General Assembly can alter,
repeal or annul a single Iota of the Constitution." 147 As a result,
any legislative act that was "repugnant" to the constitution was "ab
initio void. " 148
After establishing that the constitution was superior to statutes
and that the judiciary was the guardian of the constitution, Tucker
turned to the question whether the Treason Act "be consistent with
or repugnant to the Constitution. " 149 He candidly informed the
court, "Here my embarrassment is excessive on many Accounts-!

145

146
147

/d. at 9.
/d. at 9-10.
/d. at 1 0; see also id. ("[T)he universal concurrence of Opinion in the Citizens

of the Commonwealth [is that) Any General Assembly convened for the purposes of
civil Legislation only [does not have) the right of altering, repealing or annulling the
Constitution.~).
148
149

/d.
/d. at 11.
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have never seen the Treason Law. " 150 Earlier in his argument,
Tucker had made clear that a statute would be unconstitutional only
if it were dramatically at odds with the constitution, stating that the
constitution "is the touchstone by which every Act of the Legislature
is to be tried. If any Act thereof shall be found absolutely and
irreconcilably contradictory to the Constitution, it can not admit of
a Doubt that such act is absolutely null and void." 151 Tucker
continued:
I [am not] competent to decide so nice a point as that which this
Question [of the statute's constitutionality] includes. Yet the
reasons offered, as I am informed, by an honourable member of
the G.C. that it was the Intention of the Constitution to have as
few Obstacles as possible in the way to mercy-and some other
parts of the constitution by which it appears that particular
exclusive Privileges have been reserved to the honour of the house
of Delegates-have induced me to incline to the Opinion that the
spirit of our Constitution declares that the power of pardoning in
all cases where it is not given to the Executive is vested in the
House of Delegates alone. 152

Tucker, in resolving a question of a statute's constitutionality,
looked beyond the express limitations established by the constitutional text. Just as he had invoked the "spirit" of the constitution
in support of the notion of judicial review, now Tucker asserted that
a statute could be unconstitutional because it was inconsistent with
the "spirit" of the constitution. This broad notion of judicial review
accords with Tucker's notion of the judiciary as the "Guardian" of
the constitution.
In locating the "spirit," Tucker looked beyond the constitutional
text and considered contemporaneous testimony about intent as
well as constitutional structure. Like Randolph, therefore, Tucker
employed an argument from intent to support his position. But
Randolph used intent to mean what logic and considerations of
structure suggested that the framers intended. As Andrew Ronald,
the attorney for the prisoners, accurately (if unsympathetically)
summarized Randolph's approach, it involved "conjectures drawn
from the supposed meaning of the framers." 153 Tucker, in contrast, cited specific extra-textual evidence of the framers' intent,

150 /d.
m /d. at 9.
m /d. at 11.
15

'

Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 7 (1782).
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intent meaning subjective intent. The "honourable member of the
G.C. " 154 presumably referred to one of the members of the
General Convention that had framed the Virginia Constitution. 155
This individual had some inside knowledge into why the constitution's pardoning clause was written as it was: "[I]t was the Intention
of the Constitution to have as few Obstacles as possible in the way
to mercy .... " 156 Randolph derived intention by analyzing the
document. Tucker, in contrast, is "informed" of it. He himself is
not "competent to decide" the question of constitutionality. And by
telling the court that he had been informed of the intent of the
constitution, Tucker indicated that he believed the framers'
subjective intent was relevant to judicial exegesis of the constitution,
even though that intent was not apparent from the face of the
constitutional document.
Tucker argued that the Treason Act could not survive scrutiny
by a court that understood the constitution's meaning. "[The
statute] not only gives powers where the Constitution had tacitly
denied them, but renders that [the pardoning power of the House
of Delegates] incompleat and inadequate which the Constitution had
declared fully sufficient. " 157 Again, it is striking that Tucker's
determination that the statute was unconstitutional is not based on
an express conflict between statute and constitution; the statute is
unconstitutional because it allocates a power to the Senate which
the constitution had, as Tucker put it, "tacitly" denied. Tucker's
conclusion made clear that he believed that his earlier statement
that a statute had to be "irreconcilably" at odds with the constitution to be unconstitutional was consistent with the position that this
statute was unconstitutional. "Here then I apprehend," Tucker
stated, "we may trace an absolute Contradiction-For the Law
declared that to be insufficient which the Constitution had before
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See supra text accompanying note 152.
For another example of such a reference to the 1776 convention, see RALPH
KETCHAM, jAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 68 (1971) (referring to the May 1776
meeting of Virginia delegates at Williamsburg as the "General Convention").
Similarly, contemporaneous references to the Federal Constitutional Convention as
the "General Convention" were standard. See, e.g., 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 545 Qames Madison); 4 id. at 83 (same); 2
ANNALS OF CONG. 1360 (1790) (statement of Eldridge Gerry). Alternatively, "G.C."
could, theoretically, have been an abbreviation for "Governor's Council" or "General
Court," but since Tucker was referring to someone with special knowledge of the
"Intention of the Constitution," it seems clear "G.C." denoted "General Convention."
156
See supra text accompanying note 152.
157
Tucker, supra note 8, at 12.
155
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declared to be fully sufficient, competent and compleat." 158 In
other words, there could be an "absolute Contradiction" between a
statute and the constitution even when the statute did not run afoul
of an express constitutional prohibition, but rather the "spirit" of
the constitution. The Treason Act was unconstitutional even though
the constitution did not explicitly bar the Senate from sharing in the
pardoning power. It was unconstitutional because the framers had
wanted pardoning to be easy.
H. The Decision of the Virginia Court of Appeals

On November 2, 1782, Randolph wrote Madison:
The great constitutional question, which was mentioned in my last
letter, as having been adjourned from the general court to the
court of appeals, received a second solemn hearing on thursday.
The Judges, impressed with the dignity of it, have taken time until
this day, when it will be finally decided, if some collateral objections should not prevent the dicision [sic ]. 159

When the court reconvened later that day, the eight judges
delivered eight separate opinions, 160 and the three prisoners lost
in their bid for freedom. 161 The rationale behind the result,
however, as well as the exact vote, is a matter of dispute.
Reporter Daniel Call records all eight judges as ruling against
the prisoners. 162 According to Call, Chancellor Pendleton, adopting Randolph's statutory interpretation argument, concluded that
the Treason Act was consistent with the constitution and reserved
the issue whether a court could pronounce a statute invalid. 163
The other seven judges each declared that the court could pronounce a statute unconstitutional and void but, like Pendleton,
accepted Randolph's statutory argument and decided that the
statute was constitutional. 164 Thus, although the prisoners lost,

ld.
Letter from Edmund Randolph to james Madison (Nov. 2, 1782), in 5 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 230, 230.
160
See 2 MAYS, supra note 6, at 196 (noting that each judge was ordered to prepare
his own opinion); see also Pendleton, supra note 6, at 426-27 (summarizing the judges'
opinions).
161
See Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 20 ( 1782).
162
See id. at 13, 20.
163
See id. at 17-18.
164
See id. at 20.
158

159
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seven of the eight judges concluded that they had the power to
overturn statutes, and the final judge did not reach the issue. 165
Chancellor Pendleton's notes reflect a more complicated range
of views. 166 They indicate that two of the eight judges ruled in
favor of the prisoners. Justice James Mercer found that the court
had jurisdiction in criminal cases, stated that the Treason Act was
unconstitutional, and concluded that the pardon was therefore
good. 167 Justice Bartholomew Dandridge did not reach the issue
of the legitimacy of judicial review and he said he was "doubtful" as
to whether the court had jurisdiction. 168 He stated that the statute
and the constitution set up alternate means to pardon, the former
by requiring the approval of both houses of the General Assembly,
the latter requiring the approval only of the House of Delegates.
The pardon of the three prisoners was a valid pardon under the
constitution. 169
Of the six judges who ruled against the prisoners, all upheld the
Treason Act as constitutional. Only Justice Peter Lyons rejected
judicial review; he was "[a]gainst the Power of the Court to declare
an Act of the Legislature void." 170 Lyons, however, also concluded
that the act was not "against the Constitution. " 171 At the other
end of the spectrum on the matter of judicial review, Chancellor
Wythe " [u ]rged several strong and sensible reasons of the nature of
those used by Lord Abblington, to prove that an Anti-constitutional
Act of the Legislature would be void; and if so, that this Court must
in Judgment declare it so, or not decide according to the Law of the
land. " 172 He found, however, that the Treason Act was constitutional and that the pardon by the House of Delegates was therefore
invalid. 173
According to Pendleton's notes, no judge other than Wythe and
Mercer pronounced himself in favor of judicial review. Pendleton
came the closest, reserving the issue but suggesting that a court had

165

See id. at 7-21.
See Pendleton, supra note 6, at 426-27 (summarizing the respective views of
each judge).
167
See id.
168
/d. at 426.
169
See id. at 426-27.
170
/d. at 426.
171
/d. at 427. Justice Lyons was also the only judge of the six to find that the
court did not have jurisdiction. See id. at 426.
172 /d.
m See id.
166
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the power to pronounce a statute unconstitutional. 174 Chancellor
Blair and Justice Dandridge reserved the issue of whether a court
had power to declare a statute unconstitutional without offering a
hint as to how they would resolve the question if forced to do
so. 175 Judge Cary and Chief Justice Carrington resolved the issue
of constitutionality without mentioning the question of judicial
review. 176 Even if one believes, as Professor Julius Goebel apparently did in his analysis of the opinions, that the fact that Carrington and Cary analyzed the statute and pronounced it constitutional
suggests that they believed that courts had the power to review
statutes for constitutionality, the Case of the Prisoners is still not a
precedent for judicial review. 177 Only four of the eight judges
would have supported judicial review (and only actually voted to
invalidate the statute). Moreover, Randolph's November 8, 1782
letter to Madison shows that he viewed the court as having left open
the question of the legitimacy of judicial review. 178
Pendleton's notes report only his opinion in any detail. "[M]y
memory," he wrote, "will not allow me to do Justice to the reasoning
of the other Judges, " 179 and therefore he only recorded the results
they reached. Pendleton's account is presumably more accurate
than Call's, since it was contemporaneous. At the same time, it is
not the case, as Crosskey suggests, 180 that Call was simply working
from Pendleton's notes and altering them in order to strengthen his
claim that Commonwealth v. Caton (as the reporter called it)
was the first case in the United States, where the question relative
to the nullity of an unconstitutional law was ever discussed before
judicial tribunal [and which] ... fixed a precedent, whereon, a

174

See id. at 422.
See id. at 426.
176
See id.
177
Using Pendleton's notes, Julius Goebel, Jr., concluded that the Case of the
Prisoners was a precedent for judicial review, stating, "Five decided explicitly or by
inference that the Court of Appeals had the power to declare a law void for
unconstitutionality." 1 GOEBEL, supra note 4, at 127. Goebel classified Lyons as
denying this to be the case, and Dandridge and Blair as declining the question. See
id. This leaves Cary, Carrington, and Pendleton as those in favor of judicial review.
As will be discussed, however, Pendleton's notes indicate that he reserved the issue.
See infra text accompanying notes 192-99.
178
Letter from Edmund Randolph to james Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), in 5 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 262, 263 ("The judges of the court of appeals avoided a
determination, whether a law, opposing the constitution, may be declared void, in
their decision of Saturday last.").
179
Pendleton, supra note 6, at 418.
180
See 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 1, at 952, 960 (questioning Call's report).
175

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

532

[Vol. 143: 49 I

general practice, which the people of this country think essential
to their rights and liberty, has been established. 181
If Call had been working from Pendleton's notes, he presumably
would have included all of the language in Pendleton's notes
indicating that he was sympathetic to judicial review. Call did not
do this. 182 It appears, instead, that Call was working from some
other set or sets of notes of the court's opinions-perhaps a set of
St. George Tucker's, since Call dedicated the volume containing this
case to Tucker and acknowledged "the assistance [Tucker] kindly
lent me, to complete the following work. " 183 Thus, where Call's
account is consistent with, but more detailed than, Pendleton's-as
is the case with his report of Wythe's opinion-Call's report is
presumably accurate.
The only two opinions for which either account offers any detail
are Wythe's and Pendleton's. As previously noted, Pendleton's brief
account of Wythe's ruling makes clear that Wythe adopted the
position that an" Anti-constitutional Act of the Legislature would be
void; and if so, that this Court must in Judgment declare it so. " 181
Call's report elaborates on Wythe's rationale. The argument for
judicial review advanced by Wythe (as reported by Call) is a
separation of powers argument. The judiciary is the neutral arbiter
enforcing the boundaries established by the community through the
constitution. The discussion below follows Call's more detailed
account of Wythe's opinion.
At the start of his opinion, Wythe stressed the importance of
"discussions upon the respective rights of the sovereign and the
subject; and, upon the powers which the different branches of
government may exercise. For, by this means, tyranny has been

181

8 Va. (1 Call) at 20-21.
See, e.g., Pendleton, supra note 6, at 122 ("Like all other declared Powers each
[branch of government] has its limits, the Legislative as well as the others, which if
they Pass, it would seem their Act would be void, as well as that of an Attorney would
be, which was not Warranted by his appointment."). There is no similarly strong
language about a statute apparently being "void" in Call's report.
183
8 Va. (4 Call) at v. If, however, Call worked from Tucker's notes of the
decision, they do not appear to have been preserved. The file of Tucker's papers on
the Case of the Prisoners at the Earl Gregg Swem Library is limited to his notes of his
argument.
In addition, Call apparently did not use Tucker's notes of his own argument.
Call did not, in any case, mention what that argument was or, indeed, that Tucker
had argued. Call merely observed that the prisoners' counsel "and several other
distinguished gentlemen" argued on their behalf. Id. at 6.
184
Pendleton, supra note 6, at 426; see supra note 172.
182
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sapped, the departments kept him within their own spheres, the
c1t1zens protected, and general liberty promoted. " 185 He then
celebrated judicial review as fulfilling the ends pursued by those
discussions:
[T]his beneficial result attains to higher perfection, when those,
who hold the purse and the sword, differing as to the powers
which each may exercise, the tribunals, who hold neither, are
called upon to declare the law impartially between them. For thus
the pretensions of each party are fairly examined, their respective
powers ascertained, and the boundaries of authority peaceably
established. 186
In the critical paragraph of the opinion's treatment of judicial
review, Wythe makes clear both that the issue in the case is whether
the legislature has exceeded its constitutionally delegated powers
and that the purpose of judicial review is to hold the other branches
of government in check:
I have heard of an english chancellor who said, and it was nobly
said, that it was his duty to protect the rights of the subject,
against the encroachments of the crown; and that he would do it,
at every hazard. But if it was his duty to protect a solitary
individual against the rapacity of the sovereign, surely, it is equally
mine, to protect one branch of the legislature, and, consequently,
the whole community, against the usurpations of the other: and,
whenever the proper occasion occurs, I shall feel the duty; and,
fearlessly, perform it. Whenever traitors shall be fairly convicted,
by the verdict of their peers, before the competent tribunal, if one
branch of the legislature, without the concurrence of the other,
shall attempt to rescue the offenders from the sentence of the law,
I shall not hesitate, sitting in this place, to say, to the general
court, Fiat justitia, ruat coelum; and, to the usurping branch of the
legislature, you attempt worse than a vain thing; for, although, you
cannot succeed, you set an example, which may convulse society
to its centre. Nay more if the whole legislature, an event to be
deprecated, should attempt to overleap the bounds, prescribed to
them by the people, I, in administering the public justice of the
country, will meet the united powers, at my seat in this tribunal;
and, pointing to the constitution, will say, to them, here is the
limit of your authority; and, hither, shall you go, but no further.Js7

185
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187

Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. ( 4 Call) 5, 7 ( 1782).
/d. at 8.
/d. at 13.
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The way in which the argument is cast is illuminating. The
hypothetical horrible envisioned by Wythe is not that one branch of
the legislature is causing the execution of prisoners who are
constitutionally entitled to their lives and freedom. Rather, it is that
one branch of the legislature is "attempting to rescue the offenders
from the sentence of the law." This underscores the fact that, for
Wythe, this case was about separation of powers; it was not about
any right that the prisoners might have had under the pardoning
clause of the state constitution.
Having announced his commitment to judicial review, Wythe
then pronounced the statute constitutional, adopting the alternative
readings of the constitution that Randolph had proposed (and had
suggested to Madison were strained). 188 "This mode of considering the subject, obviates the objection made by the prisoners'
counsel, relative to the constitutionality of the law concerning
treason," he concluded, "for, according to the interpretation just
discussed, there is nothing unconstitutional in it." 189
Wythe's opinion, as reported by Call, implicitly advances a
notion of judicial review in which legislative acts are void if they are
inconsistent with a constitutional text. It should be added, however,
that Pendleton's very brief account leaves open another possibility.
The reference to "Lord Abblington" is suggestive. 190 Lord Abingdon's 1777 Thoughts on the Letter of Edmund Burke to the Sheriffs of
Bristol on Affairs in America argued that no duty of obedience existed
to laws inconsistent with the constitution. 191 Thus, there is at least
a possibility that the actual opinion delivered by Wythe reflected a
notion of judicial review that was based on the older, English-based
notion of constitutionality, rather than on a notion of a constitution
as written law. Under the older view, the citizen had no obligation
to obey the unconstitutional statute because that statute violated the
compact between governed and governors; disobedience was
justified, but it was also tantamount to an act of rebellion. In
contrast, the modern notion of a constitution as written law sees the
declaration of a statute as unconstitutional as occurring within the
context of normal governance: when a court finds a statute

188

See id.

189

!d.

190

See Pendleton, supra note 6, at 426.
See 1 GOEBEL, supra note 4, at 127-28 (suggesting that the reference was to
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Abingdon's work).
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unconstitutional, it is simply choosing which of two laws to apply,
the statute or the constitution.
Chancellor Pendleton's opinion, as reflected in his notes,
embodies the premises supporting judicial review, but it stops short
of embracing judicial review. Pendleton begins the section of his
opinion concerned with judicial review by observing that "very little
light has been thrown upon the Subject, by researches into the
history of other Countreys." 192
Even British precedent was
useless:
We find the same author Lord Coke asserting at one time the
omnipotence of Parliament, who may even change the Consti[tu]tion, and another exalting the Judiciary above them, giving Courts
power of declaring Acts of Parliament void because they are
impertinent or contrary to right and Reason, both of which are
mere speculative opinions and neither of them worthy of adoption
by the Legislature or Judiciary. 193

Virginia's written constitution made the controversy about a
statute's constitutionality different from any European precedent:
We however have happily in our hands the certain record of
our Constitution containing the Original Social Compact, wherein
the people have made their Government to consist of three great
branches, the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary, allotting to
each, its proper powers, and declaring that they shall be kept
separate and distinct, neither exercising those which belong to
another. Like all other declared Powers each has its limits, the
Legislative as well as the others, which if they Pass, it would seem
their Act would be void, as well as that of an Attorney would be,
which was not Warranted by his appointment. 194

This relatively brief passage strings together a number of critical
points. The constitution is the original social compact. As
Pendleton's use of words such as "allotting" and "declaring"
indicates, he did not see the constitution as simply codifying preexisting power relations; it created power relations. The legislature
was not, as it was in Blackstonian thought, supreme: its power was
limited and its acts, "it would seem," could be "void. " 195 The
theory justifying those limits was a delegation theory: the people,

192
19
'
194
195

Pendleton, supra note 6, at 422.
!d. (alteration in original).
!d.
!d.
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through the constitution, vested only certain powers in the
legislature and nothing more.
The quoted text suggests that Pendleton was in favor of judicial
review. The ideas that a branch of government had been delegated
only limited powers, that a written constitution made those limits
ascertainable, and that a legislative act exceeding the legislature's
powers would be "void" became the critical elements in thejudicial
review theories of Iredell, Hamilton, Wilson, and Marshall 196 (and,
as we have seen, they were the critical elements in Tucker's and
Randolph's approaches as well). During the Stamp Act crisis, as a
justice in Caroline County, he had taken the position that the Stamp
Act was inconsistent with the British Constitution and that the court
should disregard it. 197 Moreover, in 1788, Pendleton would write
an opinion for the court of appeals declaring that when "the
constitution and the act are in opposition and cannot exist together[,] ... the former must control the operation of the latter." 198
In 1782, however, he refrained from reaching this conclusion and
suggested that it was an open question whether at some point the
judicial power to invalidate legislation arguably became a legislative
power and hence unconstitutional:
But how far this Court in which it has been properly said the
Judiciary Powers of the State are concentrated, can go in declaring
an Act of the Legislature void, because it is repugnant to the
Constitution, without exercising the Power of Legislation, from
which they are restrained by the same Constitution? is a deep,
important, and, I will add, an awful question; from which,
however, I will not shrink, if ever it shall become my duty to
decide it: at present I am happy in having no occasion to make
the decision .... 199

Pendleton was able to avoid resolving the question whether a
court had the power to invalidate statutes by deciding that the
Treason Act was not in conflict with the constitution. He noted that
he had been Speaker of the House at the time the statute was
passed and that its constitutionality had been "[ w )armly" debated

196

See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (noting the judicial review
theories of Iredell, Hamilton, Wilson, and Marshall).
197
See 2 MAYS, supra note 6, at 168-71.
198
Cases of the Judges of the Court of Appeals, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135, 142 ( 1788).
For a discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 322-26. See also 2
MAYS, supra note 6, at 199 (ascribing authorship of the principal opinion to
Pendleton).
199
Pendleton, supra note 6, at 422.
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then. 200 He added that, as the presiding official, he had been
unable to debate, but had decided that the statute was constitutional
then and that "I have found no reason to alter [that opinion]." 201
The question of what the constitution meant turned on whether
"the power of pardoning is reserved to ... one or both houses [of
the legislature]." 202 This question, he declared, "should be decided according to the spirit, and not by the words of the constitution. " 203 Pendleton noted Randolph's suggestion
of throwing the words "or the laws shall otherwise particularly
direct," into a Parenthesis, leaving the latter words to operate
upon the cases of Prosecutions by the House of Delegates only,
and the Legislature with full power to direct the mode of Pardon
in other cases, in which they restrain the Executive. 204

He rejected this interpretation, however, because "it does not reach
my Idea of the Spirit of the constitution" 205 because it would
permit the legislature to give the Senate exclusive power to pardon
in all cases except those involving impeachments by the House of
Delegates, thus dramatically diminishing the House of Delegates's
role in pardoning. 206 Pendleton, however, adopted Randolph's
other suggested reading. The constitutional language that nongubernatorial pardons could not be granted "but by resolve of the
House of the Delegates" 207 meant, according to Pendleton, that
such pardons could not be granted "'without the Consent,' of the
House of Delegates." 208 Thus, the legislature could pass a statute
that, in cases in which the Executive did not have the power to
pardon, approval by the House of Delegates would be a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition for a pardon.
Approval by both legislative houses would thus be necessary for
an effective pardon. Such a reading was "congenial to the spirit,
and not inconsistent with the letter, of the constitution. " 209 The
Treason Act, because it was consistent with this reading of the
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!d. at 425.
!d. at 426.
202
Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 19 (1782).
203 !d.
204
Pendleton, supra note 6, at 424.
205 !d.
206
See id. at 424-25.
207
!d. at 417 (emphasis omitted). See supra text accompanying note 34 for the
complete constitutional clause.
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!d. at 425.
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constitution, was constitutional. Like Wythe, therefore, Pendleton
read the constitution in a way that Randolph had proposed to the
court but that Randolph had privately suggested, "to any but
lawyers[,] ... would appear unintelligible. " 210 Like the others,
Pendleton was evidently attempting to avoid a holding that the
constitution and the statute were at odds. At the same time, he did
not make this interpretative approach explicit: he did not state that
the constitution should be interpreted in a way that avoided a
determination that a statute was inconsistent with it.
Six days after the decision, Pendleton wrote Madison:
The great Constitutional question, as it was called in our
papers ... was determined in the Court of Appeals by 6 Judges
against two, that the Treason Act was not at Variance with the
Constitu[tion] but a proper exercise of the Power reserved to the
Legislature by the latter, of directg. in what other cases besides
that of Impeachments by the House of Delegates, the Executive
should be restrain'd from Pardoning, including in it the power of
directg the mode of Pardon in all such Cases, provided such mode
should necessarily involve the Consent of the House of Delegates
which it was thought preserved the Spirit of the Constitution &
was the best Interpretation wch [sic] the Inaccurate words of the
Constitution would admit of .... 211

Thus, Pendleton acknowledged the constitution's ambiguity-its
"Inaccurate words"-but the way in which the constitution had been
construed pleased him. "[T]he Spirit of the Constitution" had been
preserved.
I. Aftermath
The fact that two judges had explicitly embraced judicial
review-perhaps the first judges to do so 212-and the fact that the

210

Letter from Edmund Randolph to james Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), in 5 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 262, 263; see also supra note 101 and accompanying text
(noting Randolph's admission that his readings of the constitution were strained).
211
Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), in 5
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 8, at 260, 261.
212
The Case of the Prisoners is chronologically the third of the nine cases that have
been advanced as possible revolutionary-era judicial review cases. See supra note 1.
The weight of evidence indicates that, in fact, neither of the two earlier cases
concerned the issue of judicial invalidation of legislation. In the oldest case-the
josiah Philips Case-Virginia Attorney General Randolph decided not to proceed
against Philips on a bill of attainder, limiting the prosecution to other grounds.
There was, however, no judicial determination that the bill of attainder was
unconstitutional. See 2 CROSSKEY, supra note I, at 944-45. In Holmes v. Walton, the
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State's Attorney General had adopted the same position did not
cause controversy. "[T]he Case of the Prisoners," Pendleton
informed Madison in December, "was reduced to a thin[g] of small
moment, by the opinion of the Court that the Treason law was not
contrary to the constitution." 213
Although the court of appeals had concluded that the Treason
Act was constitutional, the House of Delegates, taking a more
rigorous view of the matter, disagreed. On November 19, 1782, it
passed a resolution stating "[t]hat so much of the Act of the General
Assembly, declaring 'what shall be treason,' as vests the power of
pardon for such offences in the General Assembly is unconstitutional, and ought to be amended. " 214 On November 23, 1782, the
House followed up on its resolution and voted in favor of an act
revising the Treason Act by vesting the power to pardon in the
House of Delegates alone. 215 In its preamble, the act asserted "the
bounden duty of the representatives of the People at all times to
preserve the constitution inviolate. "216 Since the revised Treason
Act was not enacted, however, the Senate presumably did not
approve the bill, which suggests that the Senate believed that the
existing Treason Act was constitutional.
What is of critical importance is the fact that the Case of the
Prisoners, unlike other revolutionary-era decisions in which judges
suggested that they had the power to review statutes or refused to
hold that they did not have that power, did not provoke a negative
response. There is no record of popular criticism of the two judges
who asserted that the judiciary had the power to invalidate statutes.
There was no move in the Senate against them. Moreover, the

only other case preceding the Case of the Prisoners, according to Professor Levy, "The
constitutionality of the act was not at issue, and the court gave no opinion, not even
in obiter dicta, on whether it had the power to void an act for unconstitutionality."
LEVY, supra note 4, at 93. If this is accurate, the decisions of Wythe and Mercer in
the Case of the Prisoners would be the first postindependence judicial assertions of the
power to invalidate statutes.
213
Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Dec. 9, 1782), in 5 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 382, 382.
214
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA;
BEGUN AND HELD IN THE CITY OF RICHMOND, IN THE COUNTY OF HENRICO, ON
MONDAY, THE TWENTY-FIRST DAY OF OCTOBER, IN THE YEAR OF OUR LORD ONE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-TWO 24 (Nov. 19, 1782) ( 1828) [hereinafter
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES).
215
See id. at 33 (Nov. 23, 1782).
216
Hutchinson & Rachal, Notes to Letter from Edmund Randolph to James
Madison (Oct. 26, 1782), in 5 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 8, at 217, 219 n.IO
(quoting preamble).
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Senate joined the House in providing the three prisoners the relief
that they had sought from the outset. On November 15, facing
execution, the prisoners renewed their request for legislative
pardons. 217 This time both houses concurred. All were pardoned
subject to satisfaction of a condition. Lamb and Hopkins were
required to leave the state and Caton was required to serve in the
revolutionary army for the remainder of the war. 218
"[T]his
method of recruiting has been used with several other Criminals,"
Pendleton wrote Madison, "and if they prove good Soldiers, they
will make the state abundant amends for former offences. " 219

II.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE OF THE PRISONERS

This section will explore the ways in which the case study
presented in the previous section bear on a number of major
questions concerning the development of judicial review and early
conceptions of constitutional interpretation. Contrary to the work
of Professor H. Jefferson Powell, 220 statements by participants in
the Case of the Prisoners reveal the presence of a powerful
antiliteralist approach to constitutional interpretation, one that
looked beyond the text to the constitution's spirit and, in the case
of Tucker, to evidence of the Framers' subjective original intent.
Moreover, while leading modern accounts stress the constrained
quality of early judicial review, both Tucker's argument and
subsequent Virginia case law reflect an aggressive judicial stance.
Finally, the case and its aftermath illuminate Marbury: if one
views Chief Justice Marshall as the product of a Virginia legal and
political culture which accepted judicial review early and relatively
easily, his assertion in Marbury of the power to review congressional
legislation becomes understandable in a way that is wholly different
from the classic debates about Marbury. Traditionally, the debate
about Marbury has turned on whether judicial review was part of the
original understanding or whether Marshall's decision reflected his
desire to see that a Federalist judiciary had the power to check the
Republican executive and legislature. This section contends that it

217

See jOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 214, at 18-19 (Nov. 15,

1782).
218
See id. at 58 (Dec. 4, 1782); Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison
(Dec. 9, 1782), in 5 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 8, at 382, 382.
219
Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Dec. 9, 1782), in 5 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 382, 382.
220
See Powell, supra note 13.
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was natural for a jurist produced by the Virginia political and legal
culture to champion judicial review, regardless of his politics and
regardless of whether judicial review was a consensus part of the
original understanding of the constitution.

A. Constitutional Interpretation
1. Powell and Textualism
In his influential article The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, Professor Powell has argued that the Framers, members of
the state ratifying conventions, and early interpreters of the
Constitution believed that the subjective intent of the Framers was
irrelevant to constitutional interpretation. 221 Central to Powell's
thesis is his analysis of the hermeneutical traditions that could have
influenced the Framers. "Of the numerous hermeneutical options
that were available in the framers' day," Powell writes, "none
corresponds to the modern notion of intentionalism. "222 In other
words, none supported consideration of the Framer's subjective
intentions in constitutional exegesis.
Powell contends that "[t]he two most obvious sources of
hermeneutical wisdom [on which American constitutional interpreters could draw] were the anti-interpretive tradition of AngloAmerican Protestantism and the accumulated interpretive techniques of the common law." 223 The former tradition was Protestantism's "chaste literalism" which considered invalid "any exposition
of the text that went beyond the text [itself]. " 224 This view repre-

221
Powell, supra note 13. Powell's thesis has sparked substantial scholarly debate,
although it has been fought largely on the terms of Powell's original article. In other
words, participants in this controversy have parsed the debates in the Constitutional
Convention, during the ratification controversy, and during the first years of the
Republic for evidence of how the founding generation thought the Constitution
should be construed. The two principal critics of Powell are Charles Lofgren and
Raoul Berger. For Lofgren's critique, see generally Lofgren, supra note 13. For the
debate between Powell and Berger, see Raoul Berger, The Founders' Views-According
to Jefferson Powell, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1033-34 (1989); Raoul Berger, "Original
Intention" in Historical Perspective, 54 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 296 ( 1986); H. Jefferson
Powell, The Modem MisunderstandingofOriginallntent, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513 (1987)
(reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN ( 1987) ). This Article
departs from the earlier work by focusing on a case; this focus is particularly
appropriate because that case-the Case of the Prisoners-contains relatively explicit
discussions of how a constitution should be interpreted.
222
Powell, supra note 13, at 948.
223
!d. at 889.
224
!d. at 889-90.
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sented a rejection of Roman Catholicism's "tradition of interpretation, according to which literal exposition of the text was only one
(and by no means necessarily the most important) methodology. " 225
Enlightenment thought reinforced this view.
"The
philosophes ... perceived traditional interpretation of Scripture as
one of the chief props supporting the theological absurdities and
religious oppression perpetrated by the established churches, and
saw the niggling interpretation of complicated or obscure laws as a
relic of feudal misrule and political tyranny. " 226 "Such cultural
reluctance to admit the legitimacy of significant interpretation of
written documents strongly influenced Americans in their conceptualization of the task of interpreting their new Constitution. "227
The second tradition was the common-law tradition:
The modern practice of interpreting a law by reference to its
legislative history was almost wholly nonexistent, and English
judges professed themselves bound to honor the true import of
the "express words" of Parliament .... Political and legal scholars
in both Britain and the American colonies viewed strict judicial
adherence to the legislature's language as a constitutional necessity
228

According to Powell, an exception to this rule "occurred when
the statute's wording was ambiguous, rather than clear but in
conflict with its apparent intent. "229 In this context, courts could
look to evidence outside of the statute's text, but the search was
highly constrained. They could consider the preamble of the
statute, which Powell notes was not considered an "operative
provision" of the statute. 230 They could also consider prior usage
under the statuteY 1 The critical interpretive guide was previous
judicial construction:
"judicial precedent served as the most

225

Id. at 889.
Id. at 892.
227
ld. at 893-94.
228
Id. at 897-98.
229
Id. at 898. Powell also discusses another exception to the rule that courts
should not look beyond a statute's text: "where the text was defective on its face."
ld. "In such situations," he writes, "judges were free to substitute coherence for
gibberish." !d. Outside of the statutory context, Powell notes that courts construing
wills "purport[ed] to pay particular attention to the subjective intentions of their
drafters," but this concern was "largely illusory." Id. at 896.
230
ld. at 899.
231
See id.
226
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important source of information about an act's meaning beyond its
actual text. " 232 "This followed almost by definition from the basic
notion of 'intent' as a product of the interpretive process rather
than something locked into the text by its author. "233
But even in such cases of statutory ambiguity the legislators'
subjective intent was still not a source courts could consult. "It was
generally agreed that such ambiguitas patens could not be resolved
by extrinsic evidence as to Parliament's purpose. "234 Although
references were made to "intent," the word was a term of art,
signifying "not ... what the drafters meant by their words but
rather . . . what judges, employing the 'artificial reason and
judgement of the law,' understood 'the reasonable and legal
meaning' of those words to be. " 235
Aware of both the religious tradition's and the common law
tradition's relevance to constitutional interpretation, the drafters of
the Constitution believed the latter would prove dominant:
The Philadelphia framers' primary expectation regarding constitutional interpretation was that the Constitution, like any other legal
document, would be interpreted in accord with its express
language . . . . The framers shared the traditional common law
view-so foreign to much hermeneutical thought in more recent
years-that the import of the document they were framing would
be determined by reference to the intrinsic meaning of its words
or through the usual judicial process of case-by-case interpretation.2g6

Early debates about the Constitution's meaning also reflected
the influence of the two traditions. During the struggle for
ratification, "Federalists ... treated the availability of common law
hermeneutics as a positive good: precisely because there was a
developed tradition of legal interpretation, they argued, the people
could predict with confidence the results of future constitutional
construction. "237 In the political battles of the 1790s over the
Constitution, the members of the Federalist party relied on the
common law interpretive model. "The Republicans, in contrast,
took up the cudgels of the religious and philosophical opposition to

252 /d.
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interpretation and warned that the 'wiles of construction' could be
controlled only by a narrow reading of the Constitution's expansive
language. " 238
Significant appeals to original intent of any sort only began in
1798 with the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, written by
Madison and Jefferson, respectively, as criticisms of the Alien and
Sedition Acts. Jefferson and Madison "broke new ground" 239 by
invoking the official resolutions that various states had made when
ratifying the Constitution as terms of the constitutional contract.
"[B]y focusing attention on a past historical event Jefferson and
Madison raised the possibility that other historical documents might
be relevant to determining the state's original intent. " 240 Even
Madison, who became the principal theorist of this new "original
intent" approach, did not, however, embrace anything like modern
intentionalism. He never "regarded historical evidence of the
framers' personal intentions as a definitive or even particularly
valuable guide to constitutional construction. "241
2. The Case of the Prisoners, Original
Intent, and Antiliteralism
Powell's argument about the understanding that the Framers
had when they wrote the Constitution and of how the Constitution
would be interpreted is based on inference. As he acknowledges,
"the Philadelphia framers did not discuss in detail how they
intended their end product to be interpreted. " 242 His claim that
Protestant literalism and common-law hermeneutics were the
principal influences on early thinking about constitutional interpretation thus does not reflect the fact that any contemporaneous
commentator asserted that these were the appropriate guides. It
largely reflects, instead, Powell's belief that these were the "two
most obvious sources of hermeneutical wisdom. " 243
While he focuses on the English legal tradition, Powell does not
discuss the American legal tradition-and specifically the judicial
review cases of the revolutionary era. That he did not do so is
understandable. Although scholars dispute precisely which of the
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revolutionary-era cases invalidated statutes, it is clear that in these
cases, courts either invalidated statutes principally for their failure
to comply with some extraconstitutional source, such as natural law
or tradition, or at least considered whether they could invalidate
statutes on such grounds. Thus, they shed little light on what
background notions concerning constitutional interpretation were
available to the Framers. The Case of the Prisoners is the only
revolutionary-era case in which we have a record of a court paying
close attention to the interpretation of a written constitution. 244
The previously known documents from attorneys who argued in
these early cases also provide little illumination on constitutional
interpretation. For example, the letters to the public of James
Iredell, the attorney in Bayard v. Singleton, at the time of the Case of
the Prisoners, concern his defense of judicial review as an institution,
not the argument that he made in the case as to why the challenged
statute was unconstitutional. 245 Attorney James Varnum's argument
in Trevett v. Weeden was principally based on natural law. 246
Varnum was unable to invoke a popularly enacted state constitution
for a very obvious reason: Rhode Island's Charter of 1663 remained
in effect. 247
Alexander Hamilton's argument in Rutgers v.
Waddington concerned a claim that a New York statute violated the
law of nations. 248
Tucker's and Randolph's notes and other primary source
material concerning the Case of the Prisoners are the best guides we
have from the revolutionary era as to the Framers' view of constitutional interpretation. Admittedly, too much should not be read into
documents from a single case. But, given the dearth of other
information, the surviving material from the Case of the Prisoners
becomes of critical significance. And evidence provided by the Case
of the Prisoners suggests the prevalence of views of constitutional

2

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
See Iredell, supra note 91; see also Letter from james Iredell to Richard Spaight
(Aug. 26, 1787), in 2 MCREE, supra note 91, at 172.
246
See VARNUM, supra note 1, at 11-17 (discussing the fundamental right to trial
by jury).
247
Fo1· the provisions of the Rhode Island Charter, see 5 THORPE, supra note 12,
at 3211.
248
See Brief No.6 for Waddington, Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. City Mayor's Ct.
I784), reprinted in I GOEBEL, supra note I, at 362, 368. This argument is not
developed; Hamilton simply made the point indicated in the text. See id. Hamilton's
argument was indirectly a constitutional argument because the New York Constitution
adopted the common law and, Hamilton asserted, the law of nations was a part of the
common law.
"
245
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interpretation that are inconsistent with Powell's account. Specifically, analysis of the record of the case does not support Powell's
view that the only interpretive traditions available to Americans
were predominantly or exclusively textualist and that early interpretations of the Constitution were similarly textualist.
One example of the fact that participants in the case did not
privilege text in the way that Powell's thesis would suggest is
provided by Chancellor Pendleton's note to Madison after the case
ended. Pendleton observed that the court's construction of the
constitution was one "which it was thought preserved the Spirit of
the Constitution [and] was the best Interpretation wch [sic] the
Inaccurate words of the Constitution would admit of." 249 This
statement reflects the belief that the constitutional text was
indeterminate and that constitutional "Spirit" was relevant to
interpretation. His opinion in the case also reflects a concern with
interpreting the constitution in accordance with its spirit. The
question whether one or both Houses had the power to pardon
"should be decided according to the spirit, and not by the words of
the constitution." 250 The chancellor rejected one of Randolph's
readings of the constitution because "it does not reach my Idea of
the Spirit of the constitution." 251 The reading that Pendleton
embraced was "most congenial to the spirit, and not inconsistent
with the letter, of the constitution." 252
Randolph's and Tucker's notes provide more detailed evidence
of a limited commitment to text as a source of meaning. At the
core of their arguments were their invocations of the Virginia
Constitution's spirit.
Randolph contrasted construction of a
constitution with construction of a statute. In the construction of
a statute "the masculine force of substantial sense is too often
subjected to the petty tyranny of grammatical rule, "253 but with a
constitution "the liberality, necessary to catch its spirit, must be
adopted." 254 Thus, whereas Powell sees the common-law hermeneutic as establishing the very limited outer bounds for the use of
nontextual sources, Randolph specifically rejects the common-law
tradition because it is too text-bound-"subjected to the petty

249
Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), in 5
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 8, at 260, 261.
25
° Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 19 ( 1782).
251
Pendleton, supra note 6, at 424.
252
8 Va. ( 4 Call) at 19.
m Randolph, supra note 8, at 3.
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tyranny of grammatical rule" -and therefore lacking the "liberality,
necessary to catch [the constitution's] spirit. "255
In setting forth his vision of the constitution's spirit, Randolph
appealed to framers' intent: "[E]very argument which tends to the
propriety of uniting [the Senate] in pardoning in these instances [of
impeachments], will prove the great improbability of their exclusion
being intended in any other. " 256 As previously noted, Randolph
did not ascertain intent by discussing evidence of the subjective
intent of the framers. Nonetheless, as Randolph's explicit rejection
of the common-law tradition indicates, his approach was still much
less constrained by the text than the common-law tradition would
have dictated. Rather than seeking relevant judicial precedent or
resting his claims on traditional canons of construction, Randolph
advanced an argument that was largely structural, highlighting the
selection process for senators and constitutional limits on the
Senate's power: selected by the people, rather than inheriting their
office, unable to originate or amend money bills, senators were not
"by their powers as much of aristocracy as would hang on an aspin
[sic] leaf. " 257 Moving even farther beyond the text, Randolph also
reminded the court of who the senators were and that they were the
same kind of people as those who sat in the House of Delegates:
"[Treason) strikes as deep into the happiness of the Senate as
citizens, and their existence as a body. Their judgment will be as
keen, and irritation vs. the offense as acute [as the House of
Delegates)." 258 In essence, Randolph was making the claim that
the framers had no reason to deny the senators a role in the
pardoning power because they would not be aristocrats and that the
constitution should be interpreted accordingly. In Powell's account,
structuralism and original intent enter American constitutional
discourse with the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, and in both
doctrines were used in a very limited fashion: "The intentionalism
of the Resolutions was therefore a form of structural interpretation
carried out by inference from the nature both of compacts and of
sovereignty. It was the 'intent' of the states as political entities that
the Resolutions deemed normative for purposes of constitutional
interpretation. "259
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In addition, Randolph took the position that in cases in which
a statute was challenged, unless text and spirit were in direct
opposition, the spirit of the constitution controlled constitutional
interpretation, even over the text's apparent meaning. "For if [the
constitution's] spirit opposes the exclusion of the Senate, its words
must be free from ambiguity and decided, or cannot have the
supremacy. " 260
Randolph thus was shifting the burden with
respect to the judicial obligation to follow the text. While in
statutory construction "the masculine form of substantial sense is
too often subjected to the petty tyranny of grammatical rule," in
constitutional interpretation the spirit controls, unless the text is
unambiguous. 261 The extent to which Randolph believed spirit
superior to plain textual meaning is indicated by his observation to
Madison that "I doubt not, that to any but lawyers the construction,
by which the two [statutory and constitutional provisions) were
reconcile[ d,] would appear unintelligible. " 262
Appeals to the spirit of the constitution are, if anything, even
more central to Tucker's argument than to Randolph's. Tucker
appeals to the spirit of the constitution to justify the institution of
judicial review when he invokes Montesquieu for the view that "the
same Man or body of Men should not enact Laws, or afterwards
carry them into Execution" and adds that that view of limited
powers "is also the Spirit of our Constitution. " 263 He invokes it
again as a basis for constitutional interpretation: "the Spirit of our
Constitution declares that the power of pardoning in all Cases
where it is not given to the Executive, is vested in the House of
Delegates alone. " 264
As previously discussed, in locating spirit, Tucker specifically
turned to the subjective intent of the framers: "I am informed by
an honourable member of the G.C. that it was the Intention of the
Constitution to have as few obstacles as possible in the way to
mercy. " 265 Thus, Tucker's notes reflect an approach to constitutional interpretation consistent with modern original intent
jurisprudence. In other words, Tucker's approach was opposite to
that which Powell ascribes to the framers.
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It should be added that not everyone in the case stressed spirit.
Andrew Ronald, the attorney for the prisoners, employed arguments
that embody the hermeneutical approaches discussed by Powell. He
attacked Randolph's use of original intent, saying "the words of the
constitution, and not conjectures drawn from the supposed meaning
of the framers of it, should give the rule." 266 He appealed to text:
"the act of assembly was contrary to the plain declaration of the
constitution; and therefore void." 267
He acknowledged that
ambiguity was possible, but suggested a canon of construction as a
way to resolve it: "the construction ought, in favour of life, to
incline to the side of mercy. " 268
Thus, the Case of the Prisoners does not suggest that Powell's
account is wrong. It does suggest that that account is incomplete.
There were other interpretive approaches available to the Framers
of the United States Constitution, and, if the Case of the Prisoners is
representative, those approaches may have been dominant. In
particular, both Tucker, by invoking the subjective intent of the
framers of the Virginia Constitution, and Randolph, by rejecting the
traditional approach of statutory interpretation, embraced interpretive stances at odds with those of Powell.
The appeals to the spirit of the Virginia Constitution made by
Randolph, Tucker, and Pendleton accord, not with Powell's vision,
but with Professor Morton Horwitz's novel claim in his 1993
Harvard Foreword, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality
Without Fundamentalism, that "a distinct anti-literalism seems to have
been present among some of the Virginia founders." 269 Horwitz
invokes two examples in support of this thesis. The first is Madison,
and specifically his statement in Federalist No. 37:
[1-I]owever accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves,
and however accurately the discrimination may be considered, the
definition of them may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy
of the terms in which it is delivered. And this unavoidable
inaccuracy must be greater or less, according to the complexity
and novelty of the objects .... 270
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The second example is Chief Justice Marshall and in particular his
statement in McCulloch that the federal government could employ
"means" that were "appropriate" to achieve "legitimate" ends, and
that among the appropriate means were those that "consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution." 271 Horwitz writes: "The
distinction between the letter and spirit appears to have been a
major source of anti-literalism during the nineteenth century. "272
The statements from the Case of the Prisoners that have been
discussed reveal the same awareness evidenced in the examples
cited by Horwitz of the limits of text and the appropriateness of
looking beyond text to establish a rule of law. Thus, these statements provide support for Horwitz's thesis about antiliteralism and
indicate that antiliteralism predated the framing of the Constitution.
They also show that the antiliteralist approach could be employed
notjust to empower the national government (as Marshall used it),
but also to invalidate statutes passed by a coequal branch of the
same government (as Tucker urged).
Horwitz suggests that the antiliteralist approach drew on two
hermeneutic traditions. First, it drew on a Protestant evangelical
tradition that stressed the spirit of the law (to which all had access)
over the letter (of which the learned clergy claimed a superior
mastery). 273 Second, it reflected the influence of eighteenth
century Scottish Enlightenment thinkers such as David Hume,
whose work stressed the multiplicity of meanings that particular
language could yield. 274 Both such influences are plausible. In
particular, Scottish Enlightenment philosophy clearly influenced
Tucker, who referred to Frances Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy in his
law lectures. 275 In addition to these two traditions, a third merits
mention. A relatively lax form of Anglicanism was the dominant
religion among the Virginia elite, 276 and the Anglican tradition

271 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819), discussed in
Horwitz, supra note 17, at 50.
272
Horwitz, supra note 17, at 50-51.
m See id. at 50 n.90.
274
See id. at 49 & n.86.
27
s See CULLEN, supra note 8, at 145. On Scottish Enlightenment thought
generally, see GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA 175·92 ( 1978); William Michael
Treanor, Taking the Framers Seriously, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1028·31 (1988) (book
review).
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See SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 188·
92 ( 1972) (discussing the Anglican establishment in Virginia and noting that strict
Anglicanism was not observed); see also RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
VIRGINIA, 1740·1790, at 278·93 (1982) (describing the unsuccessful attempt by the
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cautioned against acceptance of the biblical text as literally true.2' 7
Thus, there were other hermeneutic traditions beyond those
identified by Powell that were available to revolutionary Americans
and that did not rely on text to the same degree as the interpretive
traditions he identifies. The principal point here, however, is not
to identify specific sources of influence, but to indicate that the Case
of Prisoners fits into a larger tradition in late-eighteenth-century
America of antiliteralism. That tradition is perhaps best summed
up by one of Hamilton's briefs in Rutgers: "In law as in Religion
THE LETTER KILLS The SPIRIT MAKES ALIVE. "278 While
Hamilton's specific concern in making this argument in Rutgers was
with statutory interpretation, the Case of the Prisoners suggests that
this extratextual focus had application to constitutional interpretation as well.
If one takes a nonliteral approach to text, then the question
becomes what other sources to look to, beyond the text, in deriving
meaning. Tucker invoked the Framer's subjective intent. Again,
one can use the Case of the Prisoners as a starting point and fit this
evidence into a larger framework. Contrary to Powell's thesis, from
the start of the Republic, leading politicians appealed to Framers'
intent as a way of resolving constitutional controversy. Thus, in
1791, in the dispute over whether Congress had the power to
charter a national bank, Jefferson argued that it did not, because the
Framers had voted against giving Congress the power to charter
corporations. 279 In 1796, Washington refused Congress's request
for the executive branch's files on the controversial treaty that John
Jay had negotiated with the British in part on the grounds that the
Philadelphia convention had rejected a proposal that all treaties be
confirmed by statute. 280
Powell dismisses these examples as

Virginia gentry to reestablish the Anglican Church after independence, in response
to a perceived decline in public morals attributable to the contemporaneous
deterioration of Anglican institutions in Virginia).
277
See HANS W. FREI, THE ECLIPSE OF BIBLICAL NARRATIVE: A STUDY IN
EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURY HERMENEUTICS 51-54 ( 1974); ROBERT GRANT
WITH DAVID TRACY, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE 103-04
(2d ed. 1984 ).
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Brief No. 6 for Waddington, Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. City Mayor's Ct.
1784), in 1 GOEBEL, supra note 1, at 391.
279
See 5 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank
( 1791), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 284, 287 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1895),
discussed in Powell, supra note 13, at 914-15 & nn.l52-53.
280
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920-21.
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aberrational. 281 But when such uses of history are considered in
the context of the evidence from the Case of the Prisoners, it seems
to be the case that invocations of intent were part of the discourse
concerning constitutional interpretation from the very start of such
discourse in the revolutionary era.

3. Antiliteralism and Judicial Stance
The Case of the Prisoners also shows that antiliteralist approaches
to judicial review could differ significantly. On one hand, Randolph's approach is very deferential to the legislature. Thus, he
wrote, "For if [the constitution's] spirit opposes the exclusion of the
Senate, its words must be free from ambiguity and decided, or
cannot have the supremacy." 282 Unless the text of the constitution
is clearly inconsistent with the statute, the statute will be constitutional. Randolph's conception of a constrained scope of judicial
review is consistent with the one that Professor James Bradley
Thayer was to adopt in 1893 in his essay, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 283 which profoundly influenced, among others, Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter,284 as well as Judge Learned Hand, 285 and which Frankfurter
called the most important law review article on American constitutional law ever written. 286 Thayer catalogued the language of early
judicial review cases concerning when a statute should be held
invalid and noted that the cases repeatedly stated that statutes
should not be held unconstitutional unless they clearly violated the
constitution. 287 He stated that this approach was first "foreshadowed"288 by Pendleton's opinion in the Case of the Prisoners, declar-

281
See Powell, supra note 13, at 920-21 (discussing criticism of Washington for
invocation of original intent and stating that Madison's response to Washington's act
was one of "amazement"); id. at 915 n.153 (referring to "Jefferson's unusual resort
to 'legislative history' from the Philadelphia convention's nominally secret proceedings").
282
Randolph, supra note 8, at 6.
283
Thayer, supra note 3.
28
' See Wallace Mendelson, The Influence ofjames B. Thayer upon the Work of Holmes,
Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 VAND. L. REV. 71 (1 978). For recent analyses of Thayer's
work, see Symposium, One Hundred Years of judicial Review: The Thayer Centennial
Symposium, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1993).
285
See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 118-19
( 1994).
286
See HARLAN B. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 299-301 ( 1960).
287
See Thayer, supra note 3, at 138-42.
288
!d. at 140.
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ing that the legitimacy of judicial review was a "deep, important,
and, I will add, a tremendous question, the decision of which would
involve consequences to which gentlemen may not . . . have
extended their ideas. " 289 Drawing on the early cases, Thayer then
framed a deferential rule of judicial review that he argued should
continue to guide judicial assertions of the power to invalidate
statutes: "[A court] can only disregard the Act when those who have
the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have
made a very clear one,-so clear that it is not open to rational
question. " 290
The notion that the early theories of judicial review involved a
high degree of deference to legislatures has more recently been
championed by Professor Sylvia Snowiss. In her book judicial
Review and the Law of the Constitution, 291 the most complete study
of early conceptions ofjudicial review, Snowiss contends that, in the
period before Marbury, judicial review theory and practice were "to
confine the concededly unconstitutional act, to circumstances where
it was agreed that the legislature had 'in fact' violated the constitution."292 Again, Randolph's argument exemplifies this view.
Tucker's argument, however, does not. Tucker's conception of
judicial review is aggressive. Statutes can be held unconstitutional
if they violate the "spirit" of the constitution. The judiciary is the
"Guardian" of the constitution. Admittedly, Tucker states that, "If
any act thereof shall be found absolutely and irreconcilably contrary
to the Constitution, it can not admit of a Doubt that such act is
absolutely null and void, " 293 suggesting that "irreconcilabl[ e ]"
contradiction is necessary for an act to be judicially pronounced
unconstitutional. But, as Tucker's argument demonstrates, "irreconcilabl[ e ]" contradiction can occur simply because a statute
violates the spirit of the constitution. The deceptive character of
Tucker's rhetoric suggests that, in some of the cases relied on by
Thayer, judicial claims that statutes would not be held unconstitu-

289

!d. at 140 (quoting Pendleton's opinion in Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4
Call) 5, 17 ( 1782)).
290
ld. at 144.
291
SNOWISS, supra r.ote 4.
292
!d. at 34. Professor Robert Clinton has offered another way of viewing the
cases prior to the Federal Constitutional Convention as embodying a constrained
conception of judicial review. By his count, four of the six cases involved the right
to a trial by jury, and he suggests that the primary focus of the early cases was on
protecting judicial independence from legislative interference. See CLINTON, supra
note 3, at 54-55.
29
' Tucker, supra note 8, at 9.
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tiona} in "doubtful" cases may not in fact mean that those courts
read the power of judicial review narrowly.
More basically, Tucker's argument in the Case of the Prisoners
suggests the presence, in early discussions of judicial review, of a
conception of judicial review that is far broader than that described
by Thayer and Snowiss. While it is beyond the scope of this Article
to trace this alternative tradition of broad judicial review, the 1793
case of judicial review Kamper v. Hawkins, 294 the next case in which
a Virginia court confronted an unconstitutional statute, illustrates
that Tucker's argument in the Case of the Prisoners was not an aberrational statement of a young attorney. In Kamper, all five members
of the Virginia General Court held unconstitutional a 1792 statute
that gave district courts equitable powers. In their opinions, two of
the Kamper judges adopted broad views of judicial review. 295 One,
not surprisingly, was Tucker, who had ascended to the bench in
1788. 296
Tucker's view of judicial review remained consistent with his
view at the time of the Case of the Prisoners. Indeed, several weeks
after he issued his opinion in Kamper, he re-read his notes of his
argument in the Case of the Prisoners and wrote on the jacket: "Upon
reviewing (my notes] at the distance of eleven years I find I have not
changed my opinion .... " 297 Echoing his argument in the Case
of the Prisoners, Tucker in Kamper appealed to "the text of the
constitution, and the spirit of our government. "298 He noted that
the legislature had repealed statutes that were "'contrary to the true

294

3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1793). For an excellent discussion of the different
conceptions of judicial review in the case, see H. Jefferson Powell, The Uses of State
Constitutional History: A Case Note, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 196 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991 ). The only
instances between the Case of the Prisoners and Kamper in which a Virginia court
evaluated the constitutionality of a statute were the Cases of the Judges of the Court
of Appeals, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135 (1788). In the principal opinion, the court of appeals
pronounced a state statute imposing additional duties on judges without additional
compensation an "infraction of the constitution." /d. at 146. This opinion, however
was not the product of a litigated case; it was merely a judicial pronouncement, sua
sponte, on a recently passed statute. See infra text accompanying notes 325-26.
295
See Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 29-42, 66-97 (wherein both Judge Roane and
Judge Tucker espoused broad judicial review).
296
See CULLEN, supra note 8, at 75.
297
Tucker, supra note 8 (note on jacket). He added that "the haste with which it
was formed produced several inaccuracies which at this day perhaps I might have
avoided," but did not specify what those inaccuracies were. /d.
298
Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 68 (Tucker,].).
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sp1nt of the constitution. "' 299 Nonetheless, he again saw the
judiciary as uniquely entrusted with the protection of the constitution. "[T]he duty of expounding [the constitution]," he wrote at
one point, "must be exclusively vested in the judiciary. " 300 At
another point, Tucker observed that "the principles of our government have established the judiciary as a barrier against the possible
usurpation, or abuse of power in the other departments. " 301
In his decision in Kamper, Judge Spencer Roane, whom legend
asserts Thomas Jefferson would have named ChiefJustice had John
Adams not placed John Marshall on the bench in the waning days
of Adams's administration, 302 similarly took an expansive view of
the judicial role. At greater length than Tucker, Roane invoked the
spirit of the constitution as the basis for an assertion of judicial
review:
[T]he judiciary may and ought to adjudge a law unconstitutional
and void, if it be plainly repugnant to the letter of the Constitution, or the fundamental principles thereof. By fundamental
principles, I understand, those great principles growing out of the
Constitution, by the aid of which, in dubious cases, the Constitution may be explained and preserved inviolate; those land-marks,
which it may be necessary to resort to, on account of the impossibility to foresee or provide for cases within the spirit, but without
the letter of the Constitution. 303

Roane, therefore, very clearly took the position that a statute could
be unconstitutional if it violated the spirit of the constitution, even
though it was consistent with the constitutional text.
Because of this emphasis on the spirit in interpreting constitutional text, the Case of the Prisoners and Kamper also bear on a theory
of judicial review very different from Thayer's and Snowiss's, the
theory offered by Professor Suzanna Sherry. While Thayer and
Snowiss have stressed the constrained quality of early judicial
review, Sherry has sought to create an originalist basis for a more
activist judiciary by stressing the natural law dimension of the

299

!d. at 76 (quoting Virginia statute).
ld. at 79.
~ 01 Id. at 87.
~ 02 See MARGARET E. HORSNELL, SPENCER ROANE: JUDICIAL ADVOCATE OF
JEFFERSONIAN PRINCIPLES 33-34 ( 1986) (noting the legend, although suggesting "there
is reason to doubt [it]").
~ 0 ~ Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 40 (Roane,].).
~ 00
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cases decided prior to the Federal Constitutional Convention and
by arguing for the revival of natural law. 304 In developing her
historical arguments, she separates judicial review cases decided
under a constitution from those decided under extraconstitutional
law. "Where the written constitution affirmatively addressed a
problem-most often in governmental structure cases such as Caton,
but even in cases, such as Bayard, where the constitution provided
clear protection of individual rights-it was dispositive, but in other
cases, judges looked outside the written constitution. " 305 The Case
of the Prisoners and Kamper suggest that this bifurcation is too rigid.
Invocations of the spirit in these structural cases decided under
written constitutions indicate that extraconstitutional sources could
inform even such cases. At the same time, the evidence offered
here supports an end similar to Professor Sherry's. She has written:
"Especially in the cases furthest from the constitutional language,
this tacit preference for textual constitutionalism over natural law
concepts undermines the Court's decision by allowing critics to
attack the decision using the Court's own criteria of decision
making," 306 and she offered the criticism of Roe v. Wade 307 as an
example. To the extent that Sherry's concern is with providing an
historical basis for judicial activism that looks beyond the letter of
the Constitution, Tucker and Roane provide such a basis, although,
rather than invoking natural law, they were taking the position that
courts could read a written constitution broadly.
The evidence discussed here from the Case of the Prisoners and
Kamper is obviously far too limited to support a conclusion as to
what theories of judicial review were dominant at the birth of the
nation. My point here is simply to highlight the range of arguments
available. Powell's work has previously revealed the presence of a
textualist approach. What the Case of the Prisoners (supported by
Kamper) demonstrates is the presence of an antiliteralist approach
to judicial review, and it also demonstrates that that approach, in
turn, could support both judicial deference (as with Randolph) and
assertiveness (as with Tucker and Roane).

504
505
506
507

See Sherry, supra note I, at II76-77.
/d. at II45-46; see also supra note I2 (discussing Bayard).
Sherry, supra note I, at II76.
4IO u.s. II3 (1973).
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B. ChiefJustice Marshall and the Origins ofJudicial Review
Historian Charles Beard began his classic 1912 article on judicial
review, The Supreme Court-Usurper or Grantee?, with the question,
"Did the framers of the federal Constitution intend that the
Supreme Court should pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress?" 308
After reviewing the evidence bearing on this
question, he concluded the piece with the statement: "[I]t is
difficult to understand the temerity of those who speak of the power
asserted by Marshall in Marbury v. Madison as 'usurpation.'" 309
The linkage is typical. Traditionally, scholars have treated as inextricably joined the question whether Marshall acted in good faith
in proclaiming judicial review in Marbury and the question whether
the Framers intended judicial review.
In seeking to determine original intent about judicial review,
academics have looked primarily to the debates in Philadelphia, to
the state ratifying debates (where, outside of Virginia, the topic
provoked relatively little comment), to the early cases in which
courts confronted the issue of whether they had the power to
invalidate statutes, and to the popular reactions to those decisions.
The comments made in Philadelphia have been parsed very
differently, although there is general agreement that, to the extent
the matter was reflected on, federal judicial review of state legislation was deemed necessary to insure consistency with the United
States Constitution. At the same time, scholars have often stressed
that judicial review was controversial at the time the Constitution
was framed. 310
In large part, the evidence for the conclusion that judicial review
was not generally accepted is that the cases on which scholars have
traditionally focused-Rutgers v. Waddington, 311 Trevett v. Weeden, 312 and Bayard v. Singleton 313 -are cases in which the decisions
proved controversial.
(These cases have been the center of
attention because, until this Article, they were the ones about which

308
Charles A. Beard, The Supreme Court-Usurper or Grantee~. 27 POL. SCI. Q. I, I
(I9I2).
309
/d. at 34.
310
See e.g., LEVY, supra note 4, at 89-I23 (discussing evidence on judicial review
and the original understanding and scholarly debate on the subject).
311
N.Y. City Mayor's Ct. I784, reprinted in I GOEBEL, supra note I, at 392-4I9.
312 R.I. I786, described in VARNUM, supra note I.
313
I N.C. (Mart.) 48 (I787).
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the most was known. 314 ) When Judge Duane, the judge in Rutgers,
construed New York's Trespass Act in a way that avoided conflict
between it and either the law of nations or the common law, but
that was inconsistent with its apparent meaning, a group of
individuals, including prominent politician Melancton Smith,
published a sharp criticism of the holding in the newspaper The New
York Packet. 315 Additionally, the New York Assembly denounced
the decision and made an unsuccessful attempt to oust the judge
from office. 316 When the judges in Trevett dismissed the case after
the defendant had challenged the Rhode Island Paper Money Act,
the Rhode Island legislature summoned the judges in Trevett to
determine the basis for the dismissal. When one judge argued that
the statute was unconstitutional (although he also stated that the
court's judgment had simply been that the statute was not "cognizable") and another spoke in favor of judicial independence, the
legislature voted that it was not satisfied with the answers provided.
At the next election, the legislature ousted four of the five judges
who had sat on the provided case, reelecting only the judge who had
been able to avoid stating his reasons for voting in the defendant's
favor. 317 In contrast, there was no legislative reprimand when the
court in Bayard held unconstitutional a statute that barred Tories
from bringing suit to recover their confiscated properties, but even
that case suggests significant opposition to judicial review. When
the court initially delayed reaching a decision in the case, its
members were called before the North Carolina legislature to
determine if they were guilty of malpractice in office by disregarding a statute (although a determination was made not to impeach
them). 318 James Iredell's publication of his argument in favor of
judicial review met with the famous response of Richard Spaight,
one of North Carolina's representatives to the Federal Constitutional Convention, attacking judicial review. 319 Even in North Carolina, then, the assertion of judicial review was associated with
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See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
See 1 GOEBEL, supra note 4, at 137 n.138 ("'That there should be a power
vested in courts of judicature, whereby they might control the supreme Legislative
power we think is absurd in itself. Such power in courts would be destructive of
liberty, and remove all security of property.'").
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See id. at 137.
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See id. at 140-41.
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See LEVY, supra note 4, at 98.
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See Letter from Richard Spaight to James Iredell (Aug. 12, 1787), in 2 MCREE,
supra note 91, at 168, 168-70.
515

1994]

THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

559

controversy, although of a less serious dimension than in either New
York or Rhode Island. More broadly, scholars' focus on these three
cases is probably responsible in large part for the accepted view
that, to quote Professor Leonard Levy, the early judicial review
precedents "show that it was nowhere established, indeed that it
seemed novel, controversial, and an encroachment on legislative
authority. Its exercise, even when imagined, was disputed and liable
to provoke the legislature to retaliation." 320
Judicial review, however, was accepted in Virginia at the time of
the convention.
The Case of the Prisoners suggests Virginia's
amenability to judicial review. According to Randolph, the initial
reaction of the general court was to assert the power to invalidate
statutes. In the court of appeals, two judges explicitly declared that
they had the power to review statutes for constitutionality-probably
the first judges in revolutionary America to hold that they had this
power-and there was no adverse legislative response. The House
of Delegates voted to amend the challenged statute. While the
Senate did not concur, that decision did not represent defiance of
the court of appeals, since the court had held the statute constitutional. For challenging the legislature's authority, the prisoners,
rather than being punished, benefitted, because both houses then
voted to pardon them. No ongoing controversy existed for the
papers to report. The matter had become one of "small moment,"
to quote Pendleton. 321 That Randolph felt duty bound to embrace
judicial review at the expense of the prosecution's case simply
highlights the fact that in 1782 in Virginia judicial review was a
mainstream position.
There is a counterargument to all of this: the absence of
controversy may be a product of the fact that the prisoners, after all,
completely lost their case-whereas the parties challenging the state
statutes in Bayard, Rutgers, and Trevett all at least partially achieved
the ends they sought. The subsequent history of judicial review in
Virginia makes clear, however, that the prisoners' loss should not
obscure Virginia's uniquely rapid acceptance of judicial review. Of
course, that consensus was not universal. Madison, to cite the most
prominent example, continued to wrestle with the legitimacy of
judicial review. 322 Nonetheless, judicial review appears to have
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LEVY, supra note 4, at 99.
Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Dec. 9, 1782), in 5 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 382.
22
'
See Charles F. Hobson, The Negative on Stale Laws: James Madison, the
'
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gained broad approval very early. After the Case of the Prisoners, a
Virginia court next addressed the legitimacy of judicial review in
1788, when the court of appeals issued "The Respectful Remonstrance of the court of appeals, " 323 written by Chancellor Pendleton.324 Earlier that year, the legislature had passed a district court
bill requiring the judges of the court of appeals to sit on the district
court twice a year and providing no additional salary for these new
obligations. Although the statute was not challenged in a case, the
court of appeals nevertheless issued the Remonstrance. It stated
that the statute violated the Virginia Constitution because the
additional imposition of responsibilities without additional money
was effectively a constitutionally prohibited diminution in judicial
salary. 325
The legislature responded by first suspending the
challenged bill and then passing a court reorganization bill designed
to meet the concerns of the judges. 326
Kamper v. Hawkins, 321 the 1794 decision in which the court of
appeals unanimously concluded that a 1792 act gave the district
courts equitable powers, has already been discussed. 328 Unlike the
Remonstrance, this was an actual case, one that turned on whether
the district court could legitimately exercise its statutorily vested
powers. This unanimous decision reflects the acceptance of judicial
review among the members of the judiciary. Its acceptance among
members of the populace is indicated by the fact that the court
ultimately prevailed, creating a separate system of superior chancery
courts later that year. 329

Constitution, and the Crisis of Republican Government, 36 WM. & MARY Q. 215,229-30
( 1979) (discussing Madison's concerns about judicial review); Ralph L. Ketcham,
James Madison and judicial Review, 8 SYRACUSE L. REV. 158, 159 (1957) (examining
Madison's early vacillation regarding the issue of judicial review).
With respect to the other leading Virginian political thinker, it should be added
that after 1800,Jefferson retreated from his earlier support ofjudicial review, perhaps
in response to Federalist control ofthejudiciary. See Wallace Mendelson.jefferson on
judicial Review: Consistency Through Change, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 327, 330-32 (1962).
323
8 Va. (4 Call) 135 (1788).
324
See Charles F. Hobson, Introduction to 5 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 15, at
xxiii, xxxi-xxxii.
325
See 8 Va. (4 Call) at 141-47. The Cases of the judges, as reported by Call, set
forth a number of related judicial acts. For the judicial protest that followed the
init.iallegislative response to the Remonstrance, see 8 Va. (4 Call.) at 148-50.
326
See CULLEN, supra note 8, at 78-81 (discussing the history of the Remonstrance);
Note to Letter from Charles Lee to George Washington (May 14, 1788), in 9
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 58, at 797, 797-98 n.2 (same).
327
3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1794).
328
See supra part II.A.3.
329
See Powell, supra note 294, at 205.
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Virginia's broad, early acceptance of judicial review is also
indicated by Turpin v. Locket, 330 a case roughly contemporaneous
with, though decided the year after, Marbury. At issue in Turpin was
a controversial Virginia statute that provided for glebe lands,
traditionally the property of the Episcopalian Church, to be sold to
benefit the poor.
Church vestrymen challenged the statute's
constitutionality, but Chancellor Wythe ruled against them and
upheld the statute. The vestryman then appealed to the Virginia
Court of Appeals, which voted internally, three to one, with Spencer
Roane dissenting, that the statute was unconstitutional. Pendleton
drafted the majority opinion, but he died the day he was to deliver
it, leaving the fate of the statute in the hands of the judge who
would be named to replace him. If that judge were to vote that the
statute was unconstitutional, it would be overturned; if Pendleton's
successor were to vote that the act was constitutional, the court
would be deadlocked, and Wythe's opinion in favor of the statute
would control. 331
The state legislature was anxious that the law be upheld.
Tucker, still a judge of the general court, was approached and asked
how he would vote on the question if he were named to the court
of appeals. He wrote in response that it was improper for him to
comment on a pending case and that he could not bind himself in
advance to a vote one way or the other. He did, however, refer his
questioner to a section of his treatise, in which he had approved of
a plan before the Virginia legislature that imposed taxes to provide
for religious education; he suggested that his stance in Turpin could
be inferred from that passage. 332 Charles Cullen, Tucker's biographer, wrote about the incident:
When Tucker referred [his correspondent] to his essay he was
sincere in believing that his mind was not unalterably made up
concerning the pending case before the Court of Appeals, but at
the same time he was aware that any legislator could see that he
thought the state had the right to use its powers for the benefit of
its Citizens . . . . If he supported this plan [discussed in his
treatise] for the benefit of Virginia, he most likely would favor the
sale of vacant glebe lands when the proceeds were to be used to
benefit its citizens. 333
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IO Va. (6 Call) II3 (I804).
See 2 MAYS, supra note 6, at 337-45 (discussing the case).
m See CULLEN, supra note 8, at I75· 77. For the relevant section of Tucker's
treatise, see I TUCKER, supra note I, at II3-I8.
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Tucker was duly named to the court, where he joined Roane in
upholding the statute's constitutionality. The two-to-two vote of the
court of appeals left in place Wythe's opinion upholding the
statute. 334
The episode obviously shows that legislators were willing to
manipulate the appointment process in order to have a statute
upheld. For the purposes of this study, it shows, more importantly,
the degree of consensus around judicial review in Virginia at the
time of Marbury. The safest course of action for legislators who
wanted the statute to be upheld would have been to secure the
appointment of an opponent of judicial review. That their choice
was an individual who had repeatedly asserted his belief in judicial
review (one time as a member of a court that invalidated a statute)
and who, although he hinted that he would uphold the statute, was
unwilling to give a flat assurance that he would do so indicates that
in 1803 no plausible candidates for the court opposed judicial
rev1ew.
The most striking evidence of the early consensus in favor of
judicial review is that every member of the state ratifying convention
in 1788 who took a position on the legitimacy of judicial review
spoke in its favor, and that these speakers covered a broad political
spectrum. For example, Federalist leader George Nicholas explained that because of judicial review there was no need to be
concerned that Congress would exceed its powers under the
Constitution. "[W]ho is to determine the extent of such [ congressional] powers?" he asked rhetorically, and answered, "I say, the
same power which in all well regulated communities determines the
extent of Legislative powers-If they exceed these powers, the
Judiciary will declare it void. "335 Having recently written the
decision in the Cases of the judges, Chancellor Pendleton, a Federalist, noted that the Virginia state legislature had passed unconstitutional statutes and added, "My brethern (sic] in that department (the
judicial) felt great uneasiness in their minds, to violate the Constitution by such a law. They have prevented the operation of some
unconstitutional acts. "336 Leading Anti-Federalist Patrick Henry
responded, "The Honorable Gentleman did our Judiciary honour in
saying, that they had firmness to counteract the Legislature in some

334
335
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See Turpin, IO Va. (6 Call) at I28 (Tucker,].); id. at I57 (Roane,].).
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cases. Yes, Sir, our Judges opposed the acts of the Legislature.
They had fortitude to declare that they were the Judiciary and
would oppose unconstitutional acts. " 337 John Marshall himself was
unambiguous:
If (Congress] were to make a law not warranted by any of the
powers enumerated, it would be considered by the Judges as an
infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard:-They
would not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction.They would declare it void.m

Why Virginians were so supportive of judicial review is a
question that invites speculation. 339 The answer, in part, may be
that lawyers in Virginia, and the South in general, occupied a
different place in the political and social structure than they did in
northern states such as New York and Rhode Island, where judicial
review proved particularly controversial. As historian Maxwell
Bloomfield observed, "The distinctive life-style of the southern
lawyer [enabled him] ... to appeal to community sympathies [more]
than his more professionalized northern prototype. " 340 Lawyers
in the North, although claiming to be independent professionals
above the market, were typically dependent on the law for their
livelihood. Thus, Alexander Hamilton, the lawyer in Rutgers, found
it necessary at times to leave public life and return to his law
practice to make money. 341 Because law provided their source of
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!d. at 1219 (footnote omitted).
/d. at 1431; see also 9 id. at 1101 (Edmund Randolph opining that a good
judiciary stands in the way of an oppressive Congress); 10 id. at 1361 (George Mason
arguing that the federal judiciary has the duty and power to declare ex post facto laws
unconstitutional); id. at 1420-21 (Patrick Henry asserting that federal courts would
not allow Congress to prohibit appeals as to facts); id. at 1427 (Edmund Pendleton
stating that the Constitution prohibits oppressive laws and that "honest independent
Judges will never admit an oppressive construction"); id. at 1448 (William Grayson
noting that judges are expected to defend the Constitution against abridgement by
Congress).
339
The theories advanced here on why judicial review won acceptance in Virginia
represent tentative suggestions. I intend to explore more systematically the issue of
why Virginians and others responded to judicial review in the way that they did in the
larger study of which this is a part. See supra note t.
540
MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 17761876, at 50-51 ( 1976). Similarly, contrasting lawyers in the North and South,
historian E. Lee Shepard has observed that "[t]he successful lawyer-planter, falling
heir to a tradition of local dominance by a social elite, found favor with many of his
non-professional neighbors." E. Lee Shepard, Lawyers Look at Themselves: Professional
Consciousness and the Virginia Bar, 1770-1850, 25 AM.J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 10 (1981).
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See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 345-46
(1992) (describing Hamilton's self-image as a gentleman-lawyer).
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income, lawyers were a distinct economic interest group, and one
that other politically powerful interest groups, such as merchants
and farmers, would not want to have supervise the political process
through judicial review.
In contrast, Virginia lawyers, like lawyers in other parts of the
South, were typically planters for whom the law resembled an
avocation. Thus, the lawyer-planter Thomas Jefferson lauded law
for its value in politics and in service to the community: "[The
study of law] qualifies a man to be useful to himself, to his neighbors, and to the public. It is the most certain stepping stone to
preferment in the political line. "342 Historian F. Thornton Miller
has recently observed: "[F]ew lawyers and judges wished to desert
the heritage that gave social prestige in the Old Dominion. Either
the plantation was not given up upon pursuing a legal career, or, if
one did gain wealth through a law practice, a plantation was
acquired." 343 The lawyers whose notes have been discussed herein
illustrate this concept of lawyer as gentleman. Born to wealth,
Randolph, in addition to being a successful lawyer, owned a number
of plantations. 344 Trained as a lawyer, Tucker did not actually
begin to practice until he had achieved wealth through trade and
through marriage to a widow who owned three plantations, which
he then ran for several years. 345 Rather than presenting a challenge to the planter elite, such lawyers were part of it.
Thus, the differing nature of legal practice may in part explain
why the initial response to judicial review was more favorable in the
South (Virginia and North Carolina) than in the North (New York
and Rhode Island). Beyond this, it appears that in Virginia the law
played a particularly strong role in reinforcing the gentry's social
and political control and this may account for the particular ease
with which judicial review was accepted in the state. "Command of
the law," historian Rhys Isaac has written, "sustained this social

342
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph,Jr. (May 30, 1790),
in 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 449 Qulian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1961 ); see also
WOOD, supra note 341, at 346 (discussing this remark and the concept of law as an
avocation).
4
' ' F. THORNTON MILLER, JUDGES AND JURIES VERSUS THE LAW:
VIRGINIA'S
PROVINCIAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, 1783-1828, at 107 (1 994); see also A.G. ROEBER,
FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS: CREATORS OF VIRGINIA LEGAL
CULTURE, 1680-1810, at 53 (1981) (commenting on the "fluid and ill-defined
boundaries between offices and occupations of'planter,' 'lawyer,' 'merchant,' and so
on" in late-17th- and early-18th-century Virginia).
544
See REARDON, supra note 9, at 3, 193.
45
'
See CULLEN, supra note 8, at 20-23.
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supremacy of the gentry, " 346 and to illustrate this point he quotes
the satirist James Reid, "[The gentry] diligently search the Scriptures, but the scriptures which they search are the Laws of Virginia:
for though you may find innumerable families in which there is no
Bible, yet you will not find one without a Law-book. " 347 Political
control, legal control, and economic control were joined in a unitary
elite. According to Isaac:
Under the old [colonial] regime the county courts had meshed
closely with a House of Burgesses that was, in accordance with
ancient traditions of authority, a county court writ large. Under
the new form of [postrevolutionary] government ... the elected
representatives continued to be drawn largely from among the
justices of the county bench. 348

This suggests that judicial review may have won easy acceptance
in Virginia because the bench and bar were controlled by the same
type of people (and to some extent the same people) who dominated the political process. Participants in the political process were
favorably disposed towards the bench and bar, and towards judicial
review. Thus, whenJefferson wrote Madison in 1789, his argument
that there should be a judicially enforceable federal bill of rights was
explicitly linked to his faith in the judgment of the members of the
Virginia Court of Appeals:
In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you omit one
which has great weight with me, the legal check which it puts into
the hands of the judiciary. This is a body, which if rendered
independent, and kept strictly to their own department merits
great confidence for their learning and integrity. In fact what
degree of confidence would be too much for a body composed of
such men as [court of appeals judges] Wythe, Blair, and Pendleton? On characters like these the "civium ardor prava jubentium" would make no impression. 349

All of this suggests an alternative view of Marshall and Marbury.
Scholars typically discuss the judicial review aspect of Marbury in

"

6

ISAAC, supra note 276, at 133.

w /d.
48

/d. at 320.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in 14 PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 342, at 659, 660. The Latin reference is to Horace:
"justum et tenacem propositi virum/non civium ardor prava iubentium," HORACE: THE
ODES AND EPODES 178 (C. E. Bennett trans., rev. ed. 1968), which translates as, "The
man tenacious of his purpose in a righteous cause is not shaken from his firm resolve
by the frenzy of his fellow-citizens bidding what is wrong." /d. at 179.
'

"
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one of two ways. The more familiar view-the one that Professor
Robert Clinton in his recent study of judicial review and Marbury
observes has "remained the starting point for discussion ... in the
modern era" 350-situates Marbury in the context of the political
struggles, at the start of the Jefferson administration, between the
Republican legislature and executive and the Federalist judiciary
that was seeking to check the other branches of government. When
William Marbury brought suit in the United States Supreme Court
seeking a writ of mandamus directing Secretary of State James
Madison to deliver to him the Justice of the Peace commission that
President Adams had signed on his last day in office, Marshall was
placed in a seemingly impossible situation. According to Professor
Robert McCloskey:
If [Marshall and his Court] upheld Marbury and ordered delivery
of the commission, the order would surely be ignored by Madison,
the Court would be exposed as impotent to enforce its mandates,
the shakiness of judicial prestige would be dramatically emphasized. If on the other hand they did not uphold Marbury, they
would give aid and comfort to Jefferson and might seem to
support his denunciation of the "midnight appointments."m

Marshall's masterstroke was to hold unconstitutional Section 13 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, the statutory provision providing that the
Supreme Court had original jurisdiction in the matter. Thus he
established judicial review, which the Federalists devoutly desired,
while giving the Republicans the result they wanted (a loss for
Marbury) and overturning legislation that the Federalists had
enacted in the first place. McCloskey writes:
The decision was criticized for its dictum that the executive could
be called to account by judicial process, but since the requested
writ was in fact denied, no really great heat was generated even on
this point. And as for the argument for judicial review, at the time
only the Federalists paid much attention to it, and they of course
were warmly approving. 352

50
'
CLINTON, supra note 3, at 219. See generally id. at 211-23 (discussing 20thcentury interpretations of Marbury); james M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV.
219, 219-20 n.3 (1992) (describing Robert McCloskey's view of Marbury, discussed at
infra text accompanying notes 351-52, as accepted by students as "dogma").
O'Fallon's article is a recent example of a work that stresses the political dimensions
of Marshall's opinion, although O'Fallon departs from the standard view by
emphasizing the defensive quality of Marshall's position.
m ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 41 (1960).
52
'
ld. at 43.
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Marbury is thus, to quote Professor Clinton, a kind of "coup d'etat,
engineered for political purposes. " 353
The alternate (and not necessarily inconsistent) view of Marbury
is that Marshall's embrace of judicial review was correct on
originalist grounds. Charles Beard has offered the classic historical
defense of this position. 354 Professor Felix Frankfurter proclaimed
Beard's analysis of Framers' contemporaneous statements about
judicial review dispositive, 355 and Alexander Bickel, in rejecting
the claim that Marbury involved "usurpation," also invoked Beard
and stated:

[I]t is as clear as such matters can be that the Framers of the
Constitution specifically, if tacitly, expected that the federal courts
would assume a power-of whatever exact dimensions-to pass on
the constitutionality of actions of the Congress and the President,
as well as of the several states." 356
Similarly, Professor Clinton has recently written, "[T]he Court's
refusal to apply Section 13 in Marbury was consistent with Lockean
values, existing legal precedent, and the theory of judicial function
embodied in the Constitution. " 357
The Case of the Prisoners and the early history of judicial review
in Virginia suggest a different way both to view the case and to read
Marshall's opinion: Marshall was the product of a legal and political
culture that was particularly amenable to judicial review-indeed,
from all appearances, uniquely amenable to judicial review. It
should be noted at the outset that the sketchy quality of the
preserved Marshall papers-for example, departing from convention,
he did not keep copies of his own correspondence-makes it
impossible to trace with certainty the evolution of Marshall's
thinking about judicial review. 358 Nonetheless, consideration of
Marshall in the context of the history of judicial review in his home
state is illuminating. 359

m CLINTON,

supra note 3, at 219.

~ 54 See CHARLES A. BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION

46-82,
108-118 (1912) (analyzing Marbury and the evidence at the time of framing
concerning judicial review).
m See Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, I 003

n.4 (1924).
~ 56 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 15 (1962).
m CLINTON, supra note 3, at 103
~ 58 See Introduction to 1 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 15, at xix, xxi.
~ 59 For an earlier and interesting attempt to place Marshall's thought more
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Marshall received his legal education at the College of William
and Mary in 1780 under George Wythe. 360 Wythe delivered the
eloquent statement in favor of judicial review in the Case of the
Prisoners previously discussed and, as also previously noted, it
appears that Marshall was in the courtroom when that opinion was
delivered. 361 It is noteworthy that, while Wythe trained only a
relatively small part of the Virginia bar-under 200 lawyers-he
educated not only Marshall, but jefferson, Tucker, and Roane, all of
whom were important early champions of judicial review. 362 More
broadly, Wythe and, to an even greater extent, Pendleton were
Marshall's role models, and, before the Federal Constitutional
Convention, each had written a pro-judicial review opinion:
Wythe's opinion in the Case of the Prisoners being matched by
Pendleton's in the Remonstrance of the Judges. In Marbury, then,
Marshall was following the path established years before by the
jurists whom he most admired. 363
Fully appreciating the link between Marshall's experience in
Virginia with his decision in Marbury, however, requires more than
a recognition of the fact that the judiciary in that state had asserted
the power to review statutes well before Marbury. More important,
it requires recognition of the fact that judicial review had been
remarkably uncontroversial in that state. The Case of the Prisoners
and its aftermath illustrate the acceptance of judicial review, an
acceptance that arguably occurred because the legal and political
structure of the state meant that vesting power in the judiciary to
review statutes was not perceived as posing a threat to the political
process. Thus, Marshall spent his career as a legal practitioner in
an environment in which judicial review was relatively unproblematic, and he was shaped by a legal and political structure amenable
to judicial review. Due to his Virginian background, Marshall, at the
time of Marbury, must have found the question of judicial review to

generally in the context of his Virginia experience, see William E. Nelson, The
Eighteenth-Century Background ofjohn Marshall's Constitutional jurisprudence, 76 MICH.
L. REV. 893 (I978).
%o See Charles T. Cullen, New Light on john Marshall's Legal Education and
Admission to the Bar, I6 AM. j. LEGAL HIST. 345, 345-46 (I 972).
361
See supra text accompanying note IS.
362
See HORSNELL,supra note 302, at 5-6 (noting that Roane studied under Wythe);
Carrington, supra note II, at 537 (stating that Jefferson and Tucker studied under
Wythe).
363
See Introduction to 5 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note IS, at xxiii, lvii-lviii (stating
that Marbury was Marshall's attempt, at a national level, to replicate what Wythe's and
Pendleton's decisions accomplished at the state level).
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be an old one-and one that, for him and for the legal and political
community he knew best, had been resolved long before. The
often-remarked upon "self-confiden[t]"-to use Professor McCloskey's term-tone of Marbury reflects this. 364 In beginning the
discussion of judicial review in that case, Marshall declared that to
resolve the "question, whether an act repugnant to the constitution,
can become the law of the land ... [i]t seems only necessary to
recognise certain principles, supposed to have been long and well
established. " 365
For someone who had witnessed the Case of the Prisoners and its
aftermath in Virginia, the principles that Marshall then enumerated-the superiority of the Constitution to a statute and the Court's
power to disregard a statute in conflict with the Constitution 366must have seemed "long and well established." 367
CONCLUSION

While the revolutionary-era cases in which courts were asked to
decide whether they had the power to declare statutes unconstitutional have been the subject of constant study for over one hundred
years, the notes of two of the attorneys who participated in the Case
of the Prisoners-St. George Tucker and Virginia Attorney General
Edmund Randolph-have escaped scrutiny. These documents provide our best evidence of how the framing generation believed a
court should construe a constitution when determining whether to
hold a statute unconstitutional. This Article uses those notes and
other primary sources to construct a record of the case. That
record is significant for two reasons. First, it provides evidence that
the Framers of the Federal Constitution had available to them
interpretive approaches that held that the subjective intent of the
Framers was relevant to constitutional interpretation and that a
constitution should be construed in accordance with its spirit, not
just its text. Second, placing Marshall's decision in Marbury in the
context of the Case of the Prisoners and early Virginia constitutional
history-as opposed to in the context of national political and
constitutional history-suggests that Marshall's commitment to
judicial review can be understood as having been shaped by the fact

364
365
366
367

MCCLOSKEY, supra note 351, at 42.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
See id. at 178.
/d. at 176.
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that he was a citizen of the state in which judicial review won early
and easy acceptance.

